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ABSTRACT 
  
Generalized assets represent a class of multi-scale adaptive state-transition systems 
with domain-oblivious performance criteria.  The governance of such assets must proceed 
without exact specifications, objectives, or constraints.  Decision making must rapidly scale 
in the presence of uncertainty, complexity, and intelligent adversaries.   
 This thesis formulates an architecture for generalized asset planning.  Assets are 
modelled as dynamical graph structures which admit topological performance indicators, 
such as dependability, resilience, and efficiency.  These metrics are used to construct robust 
model configurations.  A normalized compression distance (NCD) is computed between a 
given active/live asset model and a reference configuration to produce an integrity score.  
The utility derived from the asset is monotonically proportional to this integrity score, 
which represents the proximity to ideal conditions.  The present work considers the 
situation between an asset manager and an intelligent adversary, who act within a stochastic 
environment to control the integrity state of the asset.  A generalized asset integrity game 
engine (GAIGE) is developed, which implements anytime algorithms to solve a 
stochastically perturbed two-player zero-sum game.  The resulting planning strategies seek 
to stabilize deviations from minimax trajectories of the integrity score. 
 Results demonstrate the performance and scalability of the GAIGE.  This approach 
represents a first-step towards domain-oblivious architectures for complex asset 
governance and anytime planning. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
 Modern engineering systems represent complex, high-utility interconnects of 
people, software, and hardware. Prototypical examples include cyber-physical networks, 
critical infrastructures, and socio-technical ensembles. These assets are considered highly 
integrated systems-of-systems with multiple, time-varying objectives and potentially 
conflicting constraints. 
 Life-cycle planning is often accomplished through hierarchical management 
frameworks which combine centralized, aggregated decision making with distributed, 
autonomous control policies. These frameworks are typically developed in conjunction 
with compliance standards, safety regulations, and design/operation guidelines. 
Fundamentally, they represent planning activities supported by expert knowledge, 
decision-support systems, and procedural consensus.  While these management 
frameworks are proven, they possess significant decision overhead and latency.  In real-
time online (RTO) scenarios, complex planning actions must be completed with near-
optimal performance guarantees in sub-second time intervals.  To address these challenges, 
computational modelling and simulation have become increasingly integrated into the 
planning process. 
 Across several industries, probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) and its variants are used 
to assess the asset condition. Several frameworks exist, such as the Risk-Based Asset 
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Integrity Management (RBAIM) proposed by Khan et al. (2010).  The current state-of-the-
art involves dynamically updating a set of probabilistic beliefs regarding the condition of 
an asset. This condition is typically based on the risks of unwanted component operations, 
process deviations, or subsystem failures. Architecturally, frameworks such as the RBAIM 
proceed in a logical manner similar to controllers with closed feedback-loops. This 
planning can be broken down into three well-defined steps:  monitoring, evaluation, and 
prescription. 
 During the monitoring phase, sensory data are cleaned, streamed, and aggregated 
into a presentation frame for input into the evaluation module. An evaluation module takes 
as input the pre-conditioned data and decides, almost exclusively through computational 
processing, a set of numerical values which describe the asset state. This typically involves 
some reduction mapping, filtration, or classification of the data into a labelled 
configuration, rating, or score. The evaluation module estimates the expected utility and/or 
reward derived from being in, or potentially reaching, a set of states. The state-transition 
likelihoods, costs, risk profiles, long-run gains/losses, and other quantities may also be 
evaluated. The final component of an asset management framework centers around 
(typically sequential) decision making. Prescription modules may provide interfaces for 
reporting and recommendation, but their primary task is action-selection. In the context of 
artificial intelligence, this phase represents a subset of automated reasoning. In control 
theory, this process can be viewed as solving for and implementing an optimal control 
policy. In operations research, it is often referred to simply as planning.  Numerically, 
prescription is effectively a dynamic performance optimization.  The objective is to take as 
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input an asset state or condition and specify a policy, strategy, trajectory, or sequence of 
state-transitions which satisfice, or optimize, some performance criteria. When the 
prescription phase completes, the chosen actions are presented as output for effectuation. 
 At a high level of abstraction, management frameworks for life-cycle asset planning 
almost exclusively follow this “three-phase” approach. The process of monitoring-
evaluation-prescription is akin to observe-decide-act and other reasoning cycles [Boyd 
1976, Stone 2007]. When the asset-environment system becomes more complex and 
uncertain, one often implements decision making behaviour through process architectures.  
Adaptive control systems, intelligent agents, and cognitive architectures are among the 
more modern examples.  In many cases, stochastic reinforcement learning is applied to 
recognize patterns, and identify features which lead to incremental performance gains.   
 In planning problems, one is often faced with an uncertain and indirect knowledge 
of the asset-environment state; this constitutes partial observability. Partial observability 
may arise from the statistical estimation of properties. For large-scale complex assets, a 
summary description of the system may be available but suffer from a reduction in 
representational power and information loss. Partial observability may also arise from raw 
measurement limitations, as well as through instrumental limits of error. This type of 
planning commonly adopts the Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) 
model. The literature on POMDPs is vast and well-developed. By themselves, these models 
are often computationally challenging, and much research has addressed dimensionality 
reductions and approximate solutions. Typical solutions implement value or policy 
iteration through dynamic programming [Smallwood and Sondik, 1973]. A further 
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complication arises when noise, errors, and stochastic effects cause actions to be 
“imperfect”. This constitutes a tremble, or deviation from the desired response. For many 
assets, these imperfections represent mistakes in restorative actions or probabilistic 
outcomes of maintenance operations. This type of planning commonly adopts a 
perturbation analysis (PA) model, which may be coupled with the aforementioned POMDP 
approach. PA is essentially a sensitivity-based gradient-descent which reasons about the 
effects of unwanted and/or unplanned behaviours.  A final challenge in planning is dealing 
with asset-environment systems given poorly specified and/or unknown rewards; this is a 
model identification problem. In this setting, reinforcement learning (RL) techniques are 
used. Common RL models include: Q-learning (QL), temporal difference learning (TDL) 
and probably-approximately-correct (PAC) learning. These methods receive feedback 
regarding the cause-effect associations between actions (state-transitions) and rewards (or 
costs). RL models are able to “learn” solutions to POMDPs without explicit specification 
of the transition probabilities. POMDP, PA, and RL models have been applied to a variety 
of problems with varying degrees of success [Cao, 2007]. 
 For our purposes, asset management frameworks reduce to sequential decision 
making through monitoring, evaluation, and prescription. Planning activities are supported 
by advances in architectures (e.g. autonomous agents, control devices), models (e.g. 
POMDP, PA, RL), and algorithmic implementations (e.g. dynamic programming, Monte-
Carlo sampling). This process has traditionally harnessed domain-specific knowledge, 
exploiting problem structure and yielding specialized solutions. 
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 The most brittle, least transferrable aspects of governance and planning occur with 
respect to modelling constructs and performance evaluations.  Modelling activities capture 
the relevant information and logical features of an asset. These must be massaged into 
desirable, functional descriptions. High-fidelity models require adequate knowledge 
representations.  Working attributes may be mined from characteristic data, and integrated 
within some information management system. In many ways, this process is time-
consuming and partially duplicated across designs [Curran, 2014].  An extension of this 
process involves the evaluation of asset performance.  Models for state-transition systems 
exist and methods for their analysis are typically well-known.  However, the “correct” 
performance metrics, operational constraints, and degrees-of-freedom are in general not 
well-known.  In a POMDP, one seeks to maximize some sequence of “states” to achieve 
some “reward” through “actions”.  This model can be applied off-the-shelf if and only if 
acceptable, well-defined notions of states, rewards, and actions are known.  For the 
purposes of system identification, evaluation, and optimization, very few “universal 
criteria” exist.  The functional mappings from model attributes to states, rewards, actions, 
and goals/objectives are again difficult and expensive to construct.  These mappings are 
typically developed on a project-specific basis, rendering them difficult to migrate beyond 
very narrow conditions. 
 As engineered systems become increasingly complex and adaptive, the decision 
making process becomes increasingly convoluted.  Objectives, constraints, performance 
criteria, and control actions become non-stationary and outright obscure.  The goals of asset 
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management become uncertain.  In a general sense, the planning problem is ill-posed, and 
new techniques must be sought. 
1.2 Motivation 
 The governance of complex assets requires systematic procedures. Planning 
activities consolidate decision-making regarding the fate, utilization, and performance of 
assets. This form of governance is often accomplished through a spectrum of high-level 
management frameworks and low-level optimal control policies.  For complex assets, these 
processes require significant automation and intelligent decision support.  Despite broad 
industry acceptance, classical architectures for asset planning are relatively brittle. 
Solutions are often ad hoc, non-interoperable, task-driven, and project-specific.  Under 
certain conditions, models of the asset and its environment may be over-calibrated.  Under 
others, the analysis may be rendered intractable or invalid.  Classical architectures require 
major rework for new asset classes, models, and mission scopes.  There is an emerging 
need for domain-oblivious, platform-agnostic solutions. 
 This thesis establishes a planning architecture which is extremely general, yet 
requires only a basic level of mathematical sophistication.  Our methodology centers on the 
desirability to preserve what foundationally constitutes a form.  Almost all components, 
processes, systems, and assets admit symbolic descriptions from which integrity is often 
sought.  Integrity in this sense represents “correctness” – a proximity to homeostasis in the 
form of stable equilibria and ideal conditions.  Our approach grounds these abstract ideas 
within the context of finite discrete state-transition systems. The definition of an asset is 
generalized to the limits of dependability engineering.  Ideas from network science and 
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graph theory are used to construct metrics for robustness, resilience, and efficiency. 
Enforcing these model-centric signatures is germane for all assets. Through this 
interpretation we are able to construct “universal” performance evaluations and planning 
objectives.  This allows a single architecture to automate this process for all assets. 
 This research is motivated by two major challenges. The first challenge is 
representational.  Solutions must provision for inputs over a massive semantic range.  This 
challenge is tackled through information theory, utilizing similarity metrics such as the 
graph edit distance (GED) and normalized compression distance (NCD).  These metrics are 
parameter-free, feature-free, alignment-free comparisons of finite objects.  These similarity 
metrics are used in conjunction with fitness indicators for model robustness and equilibrium 
to yield an integrity score.  The second challenge is algorithmic.  One must devise a fast 
procedure for identifying strategies.  The prescribed actions must securely defend against 
adversarial attacks on the asset, while behaving safely albeit opportunistically in the face 
of naive stochastic environments.  This situation presents itself as a combinatorial game 
which can be efficiently searched using backwards induction and variations of minimax. 
 The impetus therefore corresponds to generalizing the evaluation and prescription 
modules of the aforementioned “three-phase” planning architecture.  Throughout this work, 
it is assumed that adequate monitoring is available.  High-performance, real-time online 
(RTO) algorithmic solutions are sought.  These solutions must be robust, and make few 
assumptions regarding the asset or its domain. An architecture which is adaptive yet non-
brittle is developed.  Performance objectives, evaluation criteria, and optimization 
procedures are kept domain-oblivious and platform-agnostic.  The remainder of this thesis 
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illustrates the concepts of generalized assets, universal integrity metrics, and game-
theoretic optimizations.  It develops these ideas from theoretical frameworks to working 
implementations.  The result is a Generalized Asset Integrity Game Engine (GAIGE), 
which is shown to be versatile and scalable. 
1.3 Contributions 
 This thesis brings to light several areas of research and unites them under a common 
theme.  The contributions to asset integrity planning are summarized here. 
1.3.1 Generalized Asset Performability Criteria 
 Advancements in general modelling are used to formulate an abstract definition for 
generalized assets.  Several fit-for-purpose concepts are explored using the language of 
graph theory and network science.  Dependability metrics, such as reliability, availability, 
and importance, are used as performance indicators for a variety of reference graphs. The 
best-known results from information theory are used to define similarity measures.  The 
edit distance and normalized compression distance are used to construct a payoff function 
for asset fitness.  This is defined by an integrity score, which represents the proximity to an 
ideal (dependable) topological configuration. 
1.3.2 Game-Theoretic Planning 
 Asset planning is formulated as a noisy sequential game.  The base game is a two-
player zero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information and imperfect actions. The 
base game is nonetheless mean-field symmetric in payoffs (zero-sum), actions, and 
information. This form admits a minimax solution.  Perturbations to the base game structure 
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induce deviations away from minimax trajectories.  This thesis examines strategies which 
are resilient to such noise. 
1.3.3 Generalized Asset Integrity Game Engine. 
 This thesis augments brittle and non-competitive planning architectures.  These are 
often based on partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDP), with a state-
space calibrated for a particular asset or domain.  Classical, decision-theoretic planning is 
based on policy or value iteration that is optimized for harsh environments.  In harsh 
environments, risk sources are stochastic, albeit naive.  Loads and effects such as wind, 
waves, storms, earthquakes, freeze-thaw cycles, and solar damage - are by themselves 
applied passively to reduce the asset condition.  These risk sources have no direct 
knowledge of inspection and maintenance practices.  The harsh environment might act in 
an extreme manner, but possesses neither the intent, nor the intelligent look-ahead to disrupt 
asset persistence. Background aging processes, themselves mixtures of stochastic and 
deterministic mechanisms, include such things as corrosion, crack-propagation, fatigue, or 
other incidental damage.  These make up the standard antagonists in the so-called harsh 
environmental regime. 
Game-theoretic planning extends integrity reasoning to hostile environments.  In 
hostile environments, intelligent adversaries work in conjunction with natural risks to 
actively deny asset performance.  Game-theoretic asset integrity planning seeks to find 
action sequences which are robust against all possible outcomes.  Strategies must securely 
defend against worst-case attacks while ensuring safe, opportunistic utilization. This thesis 
combines several algorithms to deliver a fast, anytime-optimal response. 
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2 GENERALIZED ASSET PERFORMANCE 
2.1 The Generalized Asset 
 Abstractly, an as-set is a basic set equipped with a performance measure.  Basic sets 
are finite, discrete collections of distinct, countable objects.  A performance measure is a 
way of assigning value to any subset of elements in the set.  A complex asset is enriched 
with additional structure, such as a partially-ordered power-set.  Complex assets may 
feature recursively-nested subsets and interacting measures. Being composed of sets, 
measures, and their operations, these “abstract assets” are studied more formally in pure 
mathematics. 
 More concretely, the term asset often refers to a real-world system. Most engineered 
systems can be categorized as assets.  These systems incorporate many elements whose 
continued structural existence and correct operation generates some reward. Complex 
assets extend this concept further. They include large-scale structural ensembles of 
interacting components and subsystems. Complex assets are typically identified by 
massively modular interconnectivity.  Their utilization produces emergent, uncertain risks 
and rewards at multiple scales.  Payoffs are typically measured in terms of socio-economic 
utility.  The ownership of complex assets is distributed across many stakeholders, who 
share the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the asset. 
 Examples of modern (complex) assets include cyber-physical networks, socio-
technical systems, critical infrastructures, civionics platforms, and high-utility 
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interconnects.  While these objects have become increasingly complex, their modelling and 
simulation has become increasingly fit-for-purpose. All assets nonetheless admit a 
sequential evolution in time.  It is possible to witness the asset at discrete time-steps, and 
infer temporal difference relations between the set of previous and current observations.  
Of course, highly-variable conditions can significantly affect the belief in system 
configuration.  This belief is based on partially observable states, incomplete information 
feedback, and variable utilization profiles based on moving performance constraints.   
 Several modelling frameworks are capable of capturing the workings of complex 
assets.  A modern approach involves the use of a modelling language.  Modelling languages 
express information, semantics, and systems knowledge in a structure that is defined by a 
consistent set of rules [Jezequel et al., 2002].  The relevant system characteristics, including 
components, events, relations, and process behaviours, can be described in a modelling 
language. Several model description languages (MDL) also incorporate the ability to 
specify performance requirements and constraints which must be satisfied. In some cases, 
these boundary-like conditions are left out, or the MDL lacks a direct syntax for their 
specification. These “incomplete” descriptions are effectively domain-oblivious. Any 
information they convey regarding the performance state(s) of a real-world system must be 
extracted from the appropriateness of the model representation itself. This is in direct 
contrast to a domain-specific MDL, which possesses enough expressive power to also 
describe the fitness of the system at hand. Put another way, a domain-specific MDL 
encodes not only the structure and dynamic behaviour of the actual system, but also some 
implicit impression of its overall performance. This performance is gauged through pre-
12 
 
constructed indicators, measurable states, and/or a sense of fitness condition. The domain-
oblivious or general-purpose MDL encodes a dynamical system through a model, but does 
not embed any proper assessment of its own configuration. 
 The line between both types of model description (and their language) is not 
necessarily crisp. For example, some descriptions embed meta-data, error-checking and 
control, aggregated observations, and system-level scoring. In this work, the more general 
case is assumed; i.e. efforts to describe and embed the state of a system into its own 
description are agnostic. The setup for generalized assets is that they function like any 
MDL which coherently realizes, interprets, and encapsulates a complex real-world system. 
 In summary, a generalized asset is an umbrella term used to reference a finite 
discrete collection of information emitted and presented by a source. In this work, the 
source refers specifically to an abstract model of an actual, real-world system. The 
generalized asset captures the relevant workings through some MDL. We mainly consider 
domain-oblivious MDLs, where asset descriptions do not implicitly encode assertions 
regarding an overall fitness level or global score. This definition of generalized asset is 
broad and all encompassing. In motivating the development of a useful architecture, we 
follow with a review of the most common asset modelling frameworks. 
2.2 Modelling Institutions 
 The vast majority of generalized assets are given in terms of a model description 
language (MDL). An MDL expresses the relevant objects, states, relations, and transitions 
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of the system at hand. Paradigms for abstraction, reasoning and modelling assets vary 
greatly; Table 2.1 lists several common modelling institutions. 
Table 2.1.  Modelling Institutions. 
Institution Diagrammatic Mechanism Abstraction for 
Formal System 
 
Axiomatic Reasoning 
Rewriting 
Association Scheme Set Indexing / Design 
 
Algebraic Structures 
Combinatorial Designs 
Finite State Machine Language / Automata Models of Computation 
Process Calculus 
Process Algebra 
Message Passing Actors 
Simulations 
Block Diagram Process Flow Systems Modelling 
Vector Addition System 
(and variants) 
Traversal Space Distributed Systems 
Petri-Net 
(and variants) 
Stochastic Queue Queuing Networks 
Concurrent Processes 
Boolean Circuitry Logic Tableau AC0, NC0 Analogies 
Belief Networks 
 (Including Neural, Boltzmann, 
Markov, Bayes) 
 
Revision / Propagation 
Machine Learning Optimization 
Pattern Recognition 
Generation 
Classification 
 
 Each institution is a mathematically well-defined methodology for representing 
information, and ultimately modelling the behaviour of a logical system. Their ontological 
makeup can be categorized by their primary diagrammatic mechanisms and modelling 
abstractions. Diagrammatic mechanisms can be vaguely understood as the methods 
through which information is logically traversed, in the sense of being tagged, parsed, 
updated, and/or reasoned about. Each institution provides a modelling abstraction, which 
services a theoretical scope and range of practical applications. 
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 Many of these institutions are weakly interchangeable, as morphisms between them 
exist under appropriate conditions [Goguen and Burstall, 1992]. A common, unifying 
theme is that all of these systems involve the propagation of causality in the form of state-
transitions or other transactions.  Many logical operations in one institution are also 
available in another, or some equivalence of operations exist [Diaconescu, 2008]. 
 These institutions often admit a single, common ontological interpretation in graph-
theoretic form For example, graphs (and their labelling) generalize the diagrammatic 
mechanisms of finite state machines, block diagrams, vector addition systems, petri-nets, 
circuits, networks, and trees. Graphs can be used as abstractions for conceptual and 
semantic models. They provide structures for sub-symbolic, connectionist reasoning. 
Graphs are essentially a very general, frequently used institution for representing and 
processing information. They are encountered in computer science, systems engineering, 
and well-adopted by formal language theory. Graphs are at the heart of many programming 
paradigms. In engineering design, they serve as the basis for the Unified Modelling 
Language (UML). They also provide a standard way of formatting information in the 
Process Specification Language (PSL). The PSL is foundational to ISO 18629, which 
provides standards for industrial automation systems and integration [ISO 18629, 2006]. 
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2.3 Graphs and Their Relatives 
2.3.1 Preliminaries 
 A graph consists of two finite sets, V and E. Each element of V is called a vertex. 
The elements of E are called edges. The edges in E are pairs of vertices. Together, V and E 
form a graph, G. Graphs model pairwise relationships (edges) between objects (vertices).  
The basic notion of a graph can be extended in several ways: 
1. When the set E contains ordered pairs of vertices, we obtain a directed graph, 
or a digraph. Each edge in a digraph has a specific orientation. 
2. When the set E contains repeated elements, it becomes a multiset.  The 
resulting graph is then a multigraph. 
3. When an edge can be formed from a vertex to itself, we obtain a “loop”. 
Graphs containing loops or self-edges are known as pseudographs. 
4. Allowing edges to be arbitrary subsets of vertices gives rise to hypergraphs. 
5. Allowing V or E to be an infinite set, one obtains an infinite graph. 
6. By allowing vertices to reference or signify groups of vertices and edges 
together (subgraphs), one obtains a metagraph.  Metagraphs are “graphs of 
graphs”. 
 For notational convenience, an edge directed from vertex u to vertex v may be 
represented as {u,v}, or more concisely as uv when context allows. The order of a graph G 
is the cardinality of its vertex set. The size of a graph G is the cardinality of its edge set.  
Given two vertices, u and v, if 𝑢𝑣 ∈ 𝐸, then u and v are said to be adjacent.  If 𝑢𝑣 ∉ 𝐸, then 
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u and v are non-adjacent. Furthermore, if an edge e has vertex v as an endpoint, we say that 
v and e are incident.  The neighborhood of a vertex v, denoted N(v), is the set of vertices 
adjacent to v. For a set of vertices S, the neighborhood is the union of neighborhoods of the 
vertices in S. The degree of v, denoted by deg(v), is the number of edges incident with v, 
with self-loops counted twice. In simple graphs, this is the same as the cardinality of the 
vertex neighborhood, N(v). The maximum degree of a graph G, is defined as Δ(𝐺) =
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣) ∣ 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉(𝐺)). The minimum degree of a graph G, is defined as δ(𝐺) =
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣) ∣ 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉(𝐺)).  In normal graphs, the handshaking lemma applies, yielding a 
result that says the sum of the degrees of the vertices is equal to twice the number of edges. 
This result is also known as the first theorem of graph theory. 
 A path in a graph is a sequence of distinct vertices, 𝑣1,𝑣2,. . . , 𝑣𝑘, such that 𝑣𝑖𝑣(𝑖+1) 
is an element of E for 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑘 − 1. The length of a path is the number of edges on the 
path. A cycle in a graph is a sequence of vertices 𝑤1,𝑤2,. . . , 𝑤(𝑟−1), 𝑤𝑟 , such that 
𝑤1,𝑤2,. . . , 𝑤(𝑟−1)is a path with 𝑤1 = 𝑤𝑟 , and 𝑤(𝑟−1)𝑤𝑟 ∈ 𝐸.  Essentially, a cycle is a closed 
path.  Self-loops can also be considered cycles in the degenerate case. The length of a cycle 
is defined as the number of edges on the cycle. An odd cycle has even length, and vice-
versa. A graph of order n is considered a tree graph, or simply a tree, if and only if it is 
acyclic and contains n-1 edges. 
 A degree distribution is a probability distribution of the in- and out- degrees of all 
the vertices in a graph. A path-length distribution is a probability distribution of the lengths 
of non-cycle paths between all vertex pairs in the graph. 
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 A graph is considered connected if every pair of vertices can be joined by a path. 
Each maximal connected piece of a graph is called a connected component. A graph is 
strongly connected if every vertex is reachable from every other vertex through some path. 
If the removal of a vertex v from G causes the number of components to increase, then v is 
called a cut vertex. If the removal of an edge e from G causes the number of components 
to increase, then e is called a bridge. The smallest connected graph contains two vertices 
sharing a single edge with unit degree and path distributions.  A graph is isomorphic to 
another graph if there is an edge (and label) preserving bijection between all vertices in one 
graph and all vertices in the other graph. A graph is homomorphic to another graph if there 
is an edge (and label) preserving surjection between all vertices in one graph and all vertices 
in the other graph. 
2.3.2 Special Graphs 
 There exist several types of graphs with special attributes. The most crucial to our 
discussion are the null, empty, and complete graphs. The null graph is simply the null set, 
and contains no vertices or edges. The empty graph on n vertices, denoted by En, is the 
graph of order n where E forms an empty set. The complete graph on n vertices, denoted 
Kn, is defined as the graph of order n where ∀u ∈ V, ∀v ∈ V, uv ∈ E. 
 A graph is called ⟨Kv,Ke⟩-complete if the number of edges is related to the number 
of vertices by the following equation: 
 |𝐸| = 𝐾𝑒(
|𝑉|(|𝑉| − 1)
2
) + 𝐾𝑣|𝑉| 2.1 
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Where: 
 |E| denotes the cardinality of the edge set, or graph size. 
 |V| denotes the cardinality of the vertex set, or graph order. 
 Ke is the number of edges connecting each pair of non-identical vertices. 
 Kv is the number of self-adjoint edges, or allowable self-loops per vertex. 
 This definition of ⟨Kv,Ke⟩-completeness is unique and not found in the standard 
literature.  By convention, with Kv > 1 we have the pseudograph property, and for Ke > 1 
we have the multigraph property. In a graph-theoretic sense, this construction would be 
termed a pseudo-multi-graph. For simplicity, we refer to it as the ⟨Kv,Ke⟩-complete graph 
of order n. This graph can be denoted by the triple ⟨Kv,Ke,Kn⟩ indexing a multiplicity over 
the complete graph Kn. It can be concisely read off as K(v,e,n).  Figure 2.1 illustrates a K(v,e,n) 
for <1,2,5> and <3,3,3>. 
 
Figure 2.1. K(1,2,5) and K(3,3,3). 
 
A weighted graph is a graph in which each edge has an associated weight, cost, or 
distance. The weights are typically metric, and can be made to represent functional 
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evaluations. In a weighted graph, the weight of an edge e is denoted by w(e).  If the edge e 
directs vertex u to v, we can write w(u,v).  If no explicit weight is given, the edge is assumed 
to have weight 1 if it exists. Non-edges are usually given the weight 0 or ∞ , depending on 
the context. A weighted graph G can be represented by a weighted adjacency matrix         
𝐴 = {𝑎𝑖𝑗}, where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤(𝑣𝑖, 𝑣𝑗). 
 In general, a weighted 𝐾(𝑣,𝑒,𝑛) forms a Cartesian product space that is represented 
by a multi-dimensional adjacency array.  This array can be indexed by (3+1)-tuples which 
take a source vertex, a destination vertex, a valid edge between them, and point to a 
corresponding weight or traversal cost.  For example, 𝐾(3,4,5)could be represented by an 
adjacency list.   
The length, or number of items in this list, is found by substitution into equation 2.1 giving: 
 |𝐸|=4(
|5|(|5| − 1)
2
) + 3|5|=55 2.2 
 Each of the |𝐸|=55 edge weights of the 𝐾(3,4,5) complete graph can be queried from 
the adjacency list.  If one assigns integer labels, this can be accomplished via some 
production of the form ⟨𝑎𝑖∈𝑛, 𝑎𝑗∈𝑛, 𝑎𝑖𝑗⟩, where 𝑖𝑗 ∈ {𝑒} if 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, and 𝑖𝑗 ∈ {𝑣} if 𝑖 = 𝑗. 
 
2.3.3 The 𝑲(𝟏,𝟐,𝑵)Asset Representation 
 Many generalized assets epitomize complex, dependable systems. These systems 
can often be given in the form of K(v,e,n) = ⟨1,2,N⟩ weighted complete graphs.  The K(1,2,N) 
graph forms an 𝑁 × 𝑁 weighted adjacency matrix with all N2 elements filled.  Recall that 
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if adjacency does not exist between two model constituents, the edge element can take on 
a vanishingly small or large value, depending on the context. 
 This case has special significance, because many real-world assets are described, 
handled and processed using the equivalent of a 𝐾(1,2,𝑁)representation.  The 𝑁x𝑁 weighted 
adjacency matrix is commonly yet unknowingly encountered across several disciplines.  It 
is an efficient data structure for describing relations between dense, highly inter-dependent 
objects. Furthermore, transformations are often imposed so as to convert to and from this 
𝑁x𝑁 format.  The resulting adjacency matrices are nonetheless capable of capturing all the 
relevant state-transitions and process interactions between elements.   
Finally, because the 𝐾(1,2,𝑁) graph admits an 𝑁×𝑁 matrix, one can often extract and 
operate over certain matrix attributes, such as the characteristic polynomial or eigenvalue 
decomposition.  This makes certain assets more amenable to spectral analysis [Gertsbakh 
and Shpungin, 2011]. 
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2.3.4 Graph Dynamical Systems 
 Many generalized assets evolve as a graph dynamical system (GDS). Typically, the 
generalized asset is presented to a decision agent (or its architecture) chronologically, over 
a finite number of discrete time-steps. In the most common setup, a generalized asset is an 
encoding of what is essentially an active or live 𝐾(1,2,𝑁)graph. At each time-step, there is a 
noisy realization of an 𝑁×𝑁 weighted adjacency matrix which represents the current belief 
in the real-world asset configuration. The generalized asset performance can then be 
assessed by analyzing the sequence of graphs (or matrices), as they evolve over time. 
Formally, a graph dynamical system (GDS) consists of: 
 
 A graph 𝐺, with vertex set 𝑣(𝐺) = {1,2, . . . , 𝑛}. 
 For each vertex i, a state 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋, where 𝑋 is some finite set of states. The system 
state is given by the n-tuple, 𝑥 = (𝑥1,𝑥2,. . . , 𝑥𝑛). 
 A vertex function, 𝑓𝑣, for each vertex 𝑣, which maps the state of vertex 𝑣 at time 𝑡to 
the vertex state at time 𝑡 + 1 based on the states associated with 𝑥. Particular 
emphasis may be placed on the states of the vertices adjacent to 𝑣. 
 An update scheme that governs how the vertex functions are applied, so as to induce 
a discrete dynamical system with map 𝐹 : 𝑋𝑛 → 𝑋𝑛. 
 Characterizing the performance of a GDS is computationally difficult [Zelazo and 
Mesbahi, 2010].  Research in this area seeks local-to-global relationships, where from local 
graph properties (and update rules) one seeks to infer the emergence of global behaviour. 
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The GDS formalism is therefore applicable to a wide variety of complex systems, and is 
perhaps the most dominant subsumption within our notion of generalized assets. 
 
2.4 Performance Evaluations 
 Generalized assets must have their configurations analyzed and assessed. This 
process constitutes a performance evaluation, which determines the overall asset behaviour, 
and to what extent the asset is functioning. Whether qualitative or quantitative, highly-
detailed or of low resolution, a performance evaluation essentially maps local and global 
states to a more condensed encoding. This reduction may output a numerical score, tuple, 
or alpha-numeric string of relevant information. Mappings from states and configurations 
to their resulting scores can be constructed from two distinct evaluation paradigms. We 
categorize these as being either fitness-based or similarity-based. These evaluation types 
can also be relative or absolute. In most planning architectures, the purpose of a 
performance evaluation is to ultimately make informed decisions about the fate of the asset. 
 
2.4.1 Fitness-Based Evaluations 
 In fitness-based evaluations, several well-known and desirable properties are 
composed from the ground-up into an overall score.  This technique utilizes both indicators 
as well as metrics. Indicators identify the existence potential for factors which cannot be 
well-defined or well-measured. Indicators are typically more qualitative, and are often 
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derived from heuristics. Their development is predominantly driven by experience and a 
sense of best-practice. For our purposes, metrics are a more concrete, quantitatively 
stronger form of indicator. They may be applied to uncertain or partially-observable 
properties through estimation and/or approximation. 
 Both indicators and metrics are essentially measures of expectation based on 
experience, observations and information-gains. Combining these measures into a score 
identifies the fitness-level of the asset. This evaluation can be either absolute, relative or 
sometimes both, depending on how the scoring functions are used. An example of both 
types of fitness is captured by the Elo ratings system used in Chess, or the TrueSkill system 
used by other competitive ladders [Herbrich and Graepel, 2006]. These ratings systems 
specify strength of play which can be interpreted as a score or fitness level. The higher the 
rating, the more potent the player, and the more statistically likely to defeat any random 
opponent selected from the set of all players. This is an example of an absolute measure 
based on the ground state of the ladder. It corresponds to a difference between the 
probability distributions of a player's strength, and the distribution of strengths for all 
players. In addition, the higher the ratings difference between two randomly selected 
players, the more likely the higher rated player will defeat the lower rated player. This is 
again an assessment of the difference between two probability distributions. This scaling is 
often non-linear, with small differences in rating being more pronounced at high levels of 
play. In this way, the ratings system can also be used as a relative measure of performance. 
 Fitness evaluations often scale monotonically.  An increase (or decreases) in key-
performance measures will directly correspond to an increase (or decrease) in fitness level. 
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The main advantages and disadvantages of fitness-based evaluations are contained in Table 
2.2. 
 
2.4.2 Similarity-Based Evaluations 
 In similarity-based evaluations, asset configurations are compared and contrasted. 
The differences between asset configurations are then associated with a score. The 
similarity (or difference) may be relative or absolute depending on the chosen reference 
datum.  Similarity-based evaluations typically assign more or less importance to patterns 
of discrepancy based on their regularity, magnitude, frequency, and location.   
 An example of this type of evaluation is the edit distance between two strings.  The 
edit distance typically counts the number of operations required to transform one string into 
the other. In most contexts, one string represents the achievement of some goal, ideal, or 
reference configuration. The other string represents the current sample for comparison. In 
this way, the similarity between strings represents the performance of one with respect to 
the other. Similarity-based evaluations are able to capture the notions of “performance” and 
“integrity” in a general sense, as these are both manifestations of “deviations from 
correctness”. This has the advantage of being nearly domain-oblivious. Nonetheless, some 
notion of proximity to “correctness”, i.e. the reference design object, must be known or 
estimated in advance. Table 2.2 summarizes the key benefits and drawbacks of fitness-
based and similarity-based evaluations. 
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Table 2.2.  Fitness vs. Similarity-Based Performance Evaluations 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Advantages Disadvantages Examples and 
Applications 
 
Fitness-Based 
 
– Specialized, 
customizable. 
– Ascertains detailed, 
actionable knowledge 
about the asset. 
– Low computational 
complexity in the best 
case. 
– Requires domain-specific 
knowledge. 
– Difficult to construct and 
evaluate. 
– High computational 
complexity in the worst case. 
– Ratings systems. 
– Voting/Auctions. 
– Analytical 
Hierarchy/Network Process. 
– Evolutionary and/or 
Genetic fitness. 
– Classifiers. 
 
Similarity-
Based 
 
– Applicable almost 
everywhere. 
– Requires little 
domain knowledge. 
– Simple to construct 
and evaluate. 
– Computational costs 
are fixed/known. 
 
 
– Requires baseline reference 
object(s). 
– Provides vague, hard to 
interpret knowledge about the 
asset. 
– Operates at a higher level of 
abstraction. 
– Edit distances (Hamming, 
Levenshtein, etc.) 
– Sorensen-Dice Index. 
– Jaccard Coefficient. 
– Information-theoretic 
distances. 
– Kolmogorov Complexity. 
– Entropy estimation. 
– Discrepancy Analysis. 
– Anomaly detection. 
 
 
  
26 
 
2.5 Binary Monotone Fitness 
 The performance of real-world assets underscores dependable operation and utility 
production. These outcomes should be low-risk, safe, secure, reliable, available, and of 
high-quality.  Many of these systems are modelled as networks and graphs. The relevant 
information regarding components and state-transitions is captured by some model 
description language, which ultimately expresses a generalized asset.  Classical (non-
quantum) components and systems exist in only one discrete state at a time. In dependable 
systems engineering, the state function is almost always a fitness-based performance 
evaluation.  This implies a many-to-one composition of metrics with domain-specific 
parameters, optimizations, and tunings. 
 Because several fitness-based evaluations share similar mathematical properties, it 
is sometimes possible to abstract away from a particular asset, its domain, and specific 
analysis parameters.  This is particularly true when systems are composed of near-identical, 
tightly-coupled elements [Cox, 2009].  These elements are frequently queried together 
using similar access patterns and return similar states.  Under these conditions, it becomes 
efficient to replace the individual, potentially real-valued state evolution functions with a 
simple logical map.  This mapping is typically a truth table which determines whether or 
not components or systems exist above or below some threshold value.  This can be viewed 
kind of pass/fail test criteria, which flags the value 1 denoting existence above some 
threshold (e.g. activation potential), and 0 denoting the existence below said threshold.  A 
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structure function, Φ, can then be defined for the specified threshold which distinguishes 
between two states: a functioning or active state and a failed or inactive state. 
 Fitness-based performance evaluations, when based on threshold exceedance or 
binary compliance criteria, are often minimally sufficient for actionable decision-making 
and planning at a large-scale [Cox, 2009]. In many cases, this does not alleviate the need 
for a more intricate fitness-based analysis [Bier, 2005].  Nonetheless, this practice can be 
applied to many components and systems, as it rapidly imparts the most fundamental and 
crucial information.  A discussion is therefore necessary to appreciate the induced scope 
with respect to generalized assets. 
 
2.5.1 Binary Monotone and Coherent Systems 
 A system is considered monotone and coherent if and only if it satisfies both the 
monotonicity and coherence requirements for its structure function.  Monotonicity requires 
(i) that a structure function Φ be non-decreasing in each argument, and (ii) that the function 
maps to zero when all components are failed, Φ(0⃗ ) = 0, and maps to one when all 
components are functioning, Φ(1⃗ ) = 1.  Condition (i) implies that the system can not 
deteriorate (that is, change from the functioning state to the failed state) by improving the 
performance of a component.  Condition (ii) implies that if all the components are in the 
failure state, the system necessarily has to be in the failure state (although this is not 
necessarily sufficient).  Similarly, if all the components are in the functioning state, the 
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system is in the functioning state.  Coherence requires the system be (i) monotone, and (ii) 
each component is relevant and actually contributes to the overall structure function. 
 
 The combination of Boolean (or binary) threshold states, monotonicity and 
coherence yields a binary monotone system, which is a useful description for rapidly 
assessing the condition, state, or fitness of a sub-region within a model.  Many of the terms 
and definitions found in this section have been adapted from the work of Aven (1991), 
[Aven and Jensen, 1991]. 
 
2.5.2 Structure Functions 
2.5.2.1 Series-Parallel Systems 
 A system that is functioning if and only if each component is functioning is called 
a series system.  The structure function for a series system is given by: 
 𝛷(𝑥 ) = 𝑥1𝑥2...𝑥𝑛 =∏(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 2.3 
A system that is functioning if at least one component is functioning is called a parallel 
system.  The structure function for a parallel system is given by: 
 𝛷(𝑥 ) = 1 − (1 − 𝑥1)(1 − 𝑥2)...(1 − 𝑥𝑛) = 1 −∏(1 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 2.4 
The expression on the right-hand side can also be given in coproduct form: 
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 𝛷(𝑥 ) = 1 − (1 − 𝑥1)(1 − 𝑥2)...(1 − 𝑥𝑛) =∐(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 2.5 
2.5.2.2 k-out-of-n Systems 
 A system that is functioning if and only if at least k out of n components are 
functioning is called a k-out-of-n: good system.  Series and parallel systems represent the 
boundary cases of k = 1, and k = N, respectively.  A series system is an n-out-of-n system, 
and a parallel system is a 1-out-of-n system.  The structure function for a k-out-of-n system 
is given by: 
 𝛷(𝑥 ) =
{
 
 
 
 1  𝑖𝑓  ∑𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 𝑘
0  𝑖𝑓  ∑𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
< 𝑘
 2.6 
2.5.2.3 Minimal Cut and Path Sets 
 A cut set K is a set of components that by failing causes the system to fail, i.e., 
Φ(0𝐾⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  , 1⃗ ) = 0.  A cut set is minimal if it can not be reduced without losing its status as a 
cut set. A path set S is a set of components that by functioning ensures that the system is 
functioning, i.e. 𝛷(→ 1𝑆 , → 0) = 1. A path set is minimal if it can not be reduced without 
losing its status as a path set. 
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2.5.3 Dependability Metrics 
2.5.3.1 Reliability 
 The reliability of a system represents the probability that it has not failed. For 
binary-monotone-coherent systems, the series-parallel and k-out-of-n structure functions 
help define the reliability. The reliability of a k-out-of-n structure of independent 
components, all of which share an identical probability of non-failure (reliability) p, is 
given by: 
 𝑅 =∑(
𝑛
𝑖
)
𝑛
𝑖=𝑘
𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝)(𝑛−𝑖) 2.7 
Where: 
 R is the reliability of the k-out-of-n system. 
 p is the probability of non-failure. 
 n is the total number of components. 
 k is the minimum number of functioning components for non-failure. 
 i is the index. 
 “n choose i”, or (𝑛
𝑖
) is the binomial coefficient, given by 
𝑛!
𝑖!(𝑛−𝑖)!
 with 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, and 
𝑖, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ. 
 This system is sometimes referred to as “i.i.d. k-out-of-n:G”, where i.i.d. denotes 
independent and identically distributed, and G or F denote whether the combinatorial 
threshold k leads to a “good” or “failed” system.   
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 There exist a number of methods for reliability computation of a general structure 
such as a network or a graph. Many of these methods are based on the minimal cut (path) 
sets.  For smaller systems which are either very reliable (or unreliable), the so-called 
inclusion-exclusion principle may be applied. There also exist state enumeration methods, 
factoring (pivot-decomposition) methods, and many others. For a complete treatise of these 
methods, the reader is referred to [Aven and Jensen, 1991].  More generally, reliability 
analysis may concern itself with multi-state and non-monotone systems.  These systems 
may feature components with non-identical failure probabilities, time and age-dependent 
failure models, inter-related failures, and other effects.  A presentation of these more 
advanced reliability models is beyond the scope of this work. 
 
2.5.3.2 Availability 
 The steady-state availability (A), and failure frequency (w) are perhaps the two most 
important measures of repairable and self-healing systems [Mishra, 2008].  Several other 
steady-state availability measures can derived from these parameters. For example, there is 
the mean failure-repair cycle time (MCT), the mean up-time (MUT) and mean-downtime 
(MDT) during a failure-repair cycle, and the expected number of system failures/repairs 
during a specified time interval (T). Classically, the MCT, MUT, and MDT measures have 
been derived from the mean-time-to-failure (MTTF), mean-time-between-failures 
(MTBF), and mean-time-to/between-repairs (MTTR, MTBR).    
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These are given by: 
 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1
𝑤
 2.8 
 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 =
𝐴
𝑤
 2.9 
 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 =
(1 − 𝐴)
𝑤
 2.10 
 
Where w is given by failure expectations, according to the failure distributions of the 
components, or system.  For i.i.d. k-out-of-n:G systems, the point availability A (at time t) 
is given by the ratio of expectation in uptime over the total time: 
 𝐴 =
𝐸{uptime}
𝐸{uptime} + 𝐸{downtime}
=
𝐴(𝑘, 𝑛)
𝐴(𝑘 − 1, 𝑛)
 2.11 
 
 A powerful multi-dimensional Markov model developed by [Khatab et al., 2009], 
has been developed for analyzing state-transition systems subject to stochastic 
deteriorations and renewals.  They model the availability of non-i.i.d., k-out-of-n:G systems 
subject to repair via priority queues. Their formulation utilizes the formalism of a 
stochastic automata network (SAN), which through Kronecker algebra is able to represent 
very large scale finite capacity queueing networks. The stationary availability of each 
component and the system are evaluated. With several assumptions made, the 
corresponding numerical problem is solved using algorithms from Monte Carlo simulation. 
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This method is highly sophisticated, and the technical details can be found in [Khatab et 
al., 2009]. 
2.5.3.3 Improvement and Importance 
 The main dependability concern is to certify that real-world assets operate 
effectively in the presence of process deviations and component failures.  This analysis 
leads to network improvement and importance measures, where priority is given to 
elements (for graph-defined assets: vertices, edges) that contribute the most to the process 
or system. 
 Concepts from reliability importance can be generalized to include the 
contributions of a component towards other fitness-based performance metrics. These 
might include maintainability, serviceability, availability, risk, etc. Two importance 
measures in the literature are Improvement Potential and Birnhaum's measure. These are 
again treated in detail via [Aven and Jensen, 1991].  There are also techniques based on 
risk achievement or risk reduction, as well as the criticality importance, and Fusell-Vesly's 
measure [Cox, 2009].  Several of these measures also operate on graphs where the quality 
of edges and vertices can undergo variations.  Each measure of importance depends on 
slightly different interpretations.  However, they are all based on the contribution of a 
component's criticality to the overall system performance.  This often implies a parametric 
sensitivity analysis for the system [Mishra, 2008].  Importance measures can be useful tools 
in the system optimization process.  
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Qualitatively, this procedure can be described as follows: 
1. Identify the most important units by means of the chosen importance measure. 
2. Identify possible improvement actions for these units. 
3. Estimate the effect on reliability, availability, and performance by implementing the 
improvement. 
4. Perform cost evaluations. 
5. Make an overall evaluation and take a decision. 
This procedure can also be accomplished through simulation and importance sampling [Zio 
et al., 2006].  As an example, consider the reliability of an i.i.d., k-out-of-n:G system.  The 
value of this metric can be improved by increasing the number of components in the system.  
An increase in components from 𝑛 − 1 to 𝑛 gives the reliability improvement: 
 
Δ𝑅 = 𝑅(𝑘, 𝑛) − 𝑅(𝑘, 𝑛 − 1) = (
𝑛 − 1
𝑘 − 1
)𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)(𝑛−𝑘) 
for 𝑛 ≥ 𝑘 
2.12 
As n increases, this improvement will become progressively smaller.  The problem of 
determining the optimal system size n, the reliability level R, and the threshold level k is an 
issue which arises in system design.  The sensitivity of a change in this system reliability, 
with respect to changes in component reliability, can be found using: 
 
𝑑𝑅(𝑘, 𝑛)
𝑑𝑝
= 𝑘 (
𝑛
𝑘
) 𝑝(𝑘−1)(1 − 𝑝)(𝑛−𝑘) 2.13 
 Generalized assets may include systems which have the potential for load-sharing 
and redistribution.  The lifetime distribution for component failures is arbitrary and not 
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necessarily exponential.  Repair or replacement of failed components is delayed until some 
local criterion is met.  Until restoration, the surviving components share (perhaps 
disproportionately) the load offered to the system.  Components under these loading cycles 
are assumed to undergo accelerated aging.  This results in a more contracted life model 
and representative changes in the failure distributions. 
 This more general situation represents a stand-in utilization model, as opposed to a 
stand-by model.  For stand-in systems, switching and maintainability concerns become far 
more complex.  These models have been investigated numerous times and are difficult to 
analyze directly.  Evaluating the importance and improvement potential for stand-in 
systems is an area of ongoing research.  The works of [Mishra, 2008], [Zio et al., 2006] can 
be referenced for details. 
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2.6 Graph Fitness 
 The properties of graphs serve as extremely useful performance metrics for 
generalized assets.  In a graph-defined asset, discrete elements undergo state-transitions 
which interact to produce distinct patterns.  Many of these patterns will be discernable at 
small scales, while manifesting behaviours which are statistically, topologically, or 
dynamically congruent at larger scales.  It therefore becomes necessary to monitor, 
evaluate, and act-upon the most relevant properties of a graph.  These properties are 
numerous, and their relevance varies by application. 
 Graph fitness is a performance concept based on well-defined measures.  These 
measures can be based on graph performance indicators (GPI) or well-defined metrics such 
as resilience, efficiency, robustness, and decomposability. 
 
2.6.1 Graph Performance Indicators (GPI) 
 The fitness of graph-defined assets is sometimes measured using graph performance 
indicators (GPI).  These are categorized based on the nature of the underlying graph 
topology, and overlying coverage processes as summarized in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3. Categorization of GPI Types. 
 
GPI Type 
 
Topology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coverage 
 
 
Activity 
 
Static 
 
Dynamic 
 
 
 
 
 
Static 
– No add/remove of 
vertices or edge. 
 
– Fixed vertex and edge 
states. 
 
– e.g. bitmap image, non-
mutable array. 
 
– Vertices and edges can be 
added or removed. 
 
– Vertex and edge states do not 
change. 
 
– e.g. reconfigurable Boolean 
circuits, fabric/lattice switching. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dynamic 
– Existence of vertices 
and edges is fixed. 
 
– Vertex/edge states can 
vary by process. 
 
– e.g.  Network flow, 
traffic/capacity, petri nets, 
timed automata. 
– Creation/destruction of 
vertices, edges. 
 
– Variable states based on 
coverage processes and 
rates/locales of element 
introduction/removal. 
 
– e.g. disease spreading,  
annealing, social games. 
 
 Topological dynamics are changes in graph structure over time.  GPIs for this 
situation center on the robustness of a graph to changes in its topology.  These metrics track 
the ability of a graph to maintain structural properties while undergoing permutations to its 
vertex or edge set.  Decomposability characteristics focus on the changes to graph structure 
in response to both random and targeted vertex/edge removals.  These removals may occur 
through discrete disconnection patterns or sweeping partition operations.  The surviving 
graph(s) may potentially have new strength and robustness characteristics.  For example, 
if the surviving components are more (or less) centralized and tightly clustered, the graph 
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is said to have hardened (or softened).  Decomposition operations can therefore lead to 
non-monotonic changes in graph properties.  The opposite is also true.  The recomposition, 
or addition of new vertices and edge patterns may increase topological performance while 
reducing coverage performance, through a phenomenon known as Braess' Paradox 
[Braess, 1968, 2005].   It is therefore important to understand the induced, coupled 
dynamics between topological and coverage processes. 
 Coverage dynamics represent changes in the quantities of interest which affect 
vertex or edge states over time.  When vertex/edge states are merely Boolean existence 
values we degenerate to a form of topological dynamics.  It can be shown that any coupled 
(coverage + topological) dynamics can be transformed into an equivalent static graph 
topology [Rozenberg, 1997].  Every possible realization of the graph then becomes a 
coordinate lookup in some large configuration-space.  However, there is some inherent 
difficulty in finding and applying this transformation [Fan and Mostafa, 2006].  For reasons 
of algorithmic tractability, this method is rarely considered.   
 GPIs for coverage may also involve gauging the utilization of the graph through the 
percolation and articulation of its activation.  Activation represents a distribution of volume 
or energy of coverage.  It is directly associated with the discrete packets of exchange such 
as network flow, traffic, utility, etc.  Percolation interfaces with topology to measure the 
potential for coverage.  It measures the capability of activation to hold or spread.  
Percolation GPIs deal with reachability and connectivity.  They may be based on routability 
and conductivity, which concern the quality of routes, lengths, durations, etc.  Percolation 
is affected by the congestion levels of paths, circuits, and random walks between sources 
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and sinks.  Articulation expresses the switching resolution of a coverage process.  Its 
performance relates to percolation through the saturation of pathways and the (in) ability 
to route and/or spread activation.  However, articulation is less concerned with re-routing, 
latency, and throughput capability. It is more concerned with specificity and responsiveness 
to sensitive coverage adjustments.  Articulation GPIs seek to characterize the ability to 
manipulate and redirect activation at small scales. 
 Generalized assets can possess both topological dynamics as well as coverage 
dynamics.  This conglomeration leads to graph dynamical systems (GDS) which are 
extremely difficult to analyze and possessing GPI which are hard to compute in general. 
 
2.6.2 Graph Resilience 
 For G with fixed P, the “resilience of G with respect to P”, is the minimum number 
r, such that by removing r edges from G, one almost surely obtains a graph H not having 
the property P.  The most commonly accepted definition of graph resilience was put forth 
by [Sudakov, 2008].  The local resilience of a graph G with respect to property P measures 
how much one has to change G locally so that P no longer holds.  The global resilience of 
a graph is defined analogously, where the changes and properties are global.  The resilience 
of many graph properties can be used to construct valid GPIs for complex assets. 
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2.6.3 Graph Efficiency 
 Efficiency is another commonly used metric to assess graph models and graph-
defined assets.  It is predominantly a measure of coverage potential, and expresses a 
resistance to failure from the perspective of coverage inadequacy.  It can be computed at 
both local and global scales [Latora and Massimo, 2001].  
The average efficiency of a graph G is given by: 
 𝜂𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝐺) =
2
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)
∑
1
𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖<𝑗∈𝐺
 2.14 
The average local efficiency of a graph G is given by: 
 η𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙(𝐺) =
1
𝑁
∑η𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝐺𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖∈𝐺
 2.15 
The average global efficiency of a graph G is given by: 
 η𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙(𝐺) =
η𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝐺)
η𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝐺𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙)
 2.16 
Where: 
 N is the total number of nodes in the graph G. 
 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) ≃ 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗) approximates the shortest path between node i and j. 
 𝐺𝑖 is the local subgraph consisting only of a node i's immediate neighbours, but not 
node i itself, in a graph 𝐺 with 𝑁 total nodes. 
 𝐺𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 is a reference graph with idealized properties, such as the complete graph or 
random graph, depending on the context. 
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2.6.4 Decomposability Metrics 
 Measures of decomposability study the inter-connectedness of a graph as it survives 
partitions through vertex and/or edge removals.  The decomposition process can be 
systematic or essentially random.  A graph-defined asset suffering random component 
failures will exhibit fitness degradation.  Resistance to this process is effectively a form of 
graph reliability.  Similarly, an adversary seeking to inflict maximal damage to an asset 
may have his actions viewed as a dismantling of key structural features in a model.  
Resistance to this process can be measured by the Isoperimetric Number, which is also 
known as the Cheeger Constant. 
 Robustness to these and other effects can be captured by several topological and 
coverage-based GPIs.  Examples include the Hosoya or Wiener Index, the Estrada Index, 
or Tutte Polynomial.  These measures are outlined in detail in the work of [Bunke et al., 
2008].  As an example in graph robustness, let Ω(𝑣, 𝑒)be the set of all connected graphs G 
with v vertices and e edges.  Assume that the components fail independently of each other 
with probability 1 − 𝑝.  The familiar reliability equation gives the probability that a graph 
G is connected: 
 𝑅(𝐺) =∑𝑆𝑟(𝐺)𝑝
𝑟(1 − 𝑝)(𝑣−𝑟)
𝑣
𝑟=1
 2.17 
Where 𝑆𝑟(𝐺) is the number of connected induced subgraphs of G that contain exactly r 
vertices.  An r-cutset of G is defined to be a set of r vertices in G that when removed from 
G, leave it disconnected. The number of r-cutsets of G is denoted 𝐶𝑟(𝐺).   
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Since any set of r vertices in G must be either connected or disconnected, the following 
relation holds: 
 𝑆𝑟(𝐺) + 𝐶(𝑣−𝑟)(𝐺) = (
𝑣
𝑟
) 2.18 
Given p, there is always at least one locally best graph in 𝛺(𝑣, 𝑒), i.e., a graph that is the 
“most reliable” in the sense of connection probability. This interpretation of graph 
reliability can be seen as a probability of surviving successive cuts and removals while 
remaining connected. 
 The isoperimetric number, or Cheeger constant is a numerical measure of a graph’s 
disposition towards bottlenecks.  It is yet another measure used to assess the inter-
connectedness of a graph.  Let G be a finite undirected graph with vertex set V(G) and edge 
set E(G). 
For an allocation of vertices 𝐵 ⊆ 𝑉(𝐺), let 𝜕𝐵 = {(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝐸(𝐺): 𝑥 ∈ 𝐵, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑉 (𝐺) 𝐵⁄ } 
denote the collection of all edges from a vertex x in B to a vertex y outside of B.  Then the 
isoperimetric number, or Cheeger constant of G, denoted h(G), is given by: 
 ℎ(𝐺) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{
∣ 𝜕𝐵 ∣
∣ 𝐵 ∣
: 𝐵 ⊆ 𝑉(𝐺),0 <∣ 𝐴 ∣≤
1
2
∣ 𝑉(𝐺) ∣} 2.19 
Note that ℎ(𝐺)is positive if, and only if, G is connected. The value of ℎ(𝐺)is large if 
partitions of the vertex set B lead to subsets with many edges between them. 
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2.7 Normalized Compression Distance 
 A reasonable notion of similarity is how difficult it would be to transform one object 
into another, using the most efficient transformation possible.  The normalized information 
distance (NID) is universal in this regard [Li et al., 2004].  Unfortunately, the NID is also 
incomputable in general [Vitanyi et al., 2008].   Admissible information-theoretic distances 
have been successfully applied to a variety of objects.  The most prolific of these is the 
normalized compression distance (NCD). 
2.7.1 Kolmogorov Complexity 
 Kolmogorov complexity is a notion of information content.  It is based on two 
principles: (a) all data can be represented as a bit string; (b) the shorter this string can be 
described, the less information is contained in it.  These principles are detailed in [Li et al., 
2004 ] and [Vitanyi et al., 2008].  The main idea is that with respect to some universal 
Turing machine 𝑈, there must be some minimal description for any given data given by: 
 𝐾𝑈(𝑥)=𝑚𝑖𝑛{|𝑦|:𝑈(𝑦)=𝑥} 2.20 
 The Kolmogorov complexity 𝐾𝑈(𝑥)of a string 𝑥 is uncomputable in general.  There 
can be no algorithm which computes the Komolgorov complexity of x for all x, so that 
∀𝑥, 𝐾𝑈(𝑥) ∉ 𝑇(𝑈).  This result can be bounded from above, and for every algorithm which 
bounds it, there is another algorithm which provides a better bound.  Fortunately, all 
computable compressors approximate 𝐾𝑈(𝑥). 
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 The Kolmogorov complexity of a file is a lower bound on the length of the ultimate 
compressed version of that file.  If one assumes that the natural data contain only effective 
regularities that a good compressor finds, then 𝐾𝑈(𝑥)is only slightly smaller (up to a 
constant factor) than the length of the compressed version 𝐶(𝑥); that is 𝐶(𝑥) + 𝑂(|𝑥|) ≈
𝐾𝑈(𝑥). 
2.7.2 Normalized Information Distance 
 The normalized (symmetric) information distance (NID) is given by: 
 𝑁𝐼𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦)=
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐾(𝑥 ∣ 𝑦), 𝐾(𝑦 ∣ 𝑥)]
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐾(𝑥), 𝐾(𝑦)]
 2.21 
When the incomputable functions 𝐾(*) are approximated by a good choice of compressor 
𝐶(*), one obtains the normalized compression distance. 
2.7.3 Normalized Compression Distance 
 The normalized compression distance (NCD) expresses the similarity between any 
pairs of finite objects.  The NCD is an information-theoretic measure of how difficult it is 
to convert one object into the other through computational means given by: 
 𝑁𝐶𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦)=
𝐶(𝑥||𝑦)-𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝐶(𝑥), 𝐶(𝑦)]
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐶(𝑥), 𝐶(𝑦)]
 2.22 
Where || is the familiar concatenation operator, and 𝐶(𝑥||𝑦)denotes a compression of the 
concatenated representation of objects 𝑥 and 𝑦.  This compression is assumed to be roughly 
symmetric, so that 𝐶(𝑥||𝑦) ≃ 𝐶(𝑦||𝑥).   
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When the data emanates from generalized assets, which can be represented by graphs or as 
models described in some language, the notion of concatenation is extended to these 
descriptions.  That is, two models (e.g. graphs) X and Y are combined (joined, concatenated) 
into a single equivalent model (or graph) XY. 
 The idea behind the NCD is that if X and Y share common information, they will 
compress together better than separately, as the compressor will be able to reuse the 
recurring patterns found in one of them to more efficiently compress the other.  In practice, 
the NCD is a non-negative number, 0 − ϵ ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1 + ϵ, representing how different two 
objects are.  Similar numbers represent more similar objects.  The ϵ in these bounds is due 
to imperfections in compression techniques.  For most standard compression algorithms, 
one is unlikely to see an epsilon above 0.1 [Vitanyi et al., 2008]. 
 The NCD is intended to be universally applicable.  As a similarity metric, the NCD 
has been put through numerous stress tests, for instance in [Nykter et al., 2008].  Its main 
advantages include being parameter-free, feature-free, alignment-free, and resistant to 
noise [Cebrian et al., 2007].  It can be explicitly computed, and is useful in clustering, 
classification, and anomaly detection tasks.  This makes the NCD both theoretically and 
practically appealing, as access to a simple lossless compressor (such as GZIP or LZW) 
allows one to evaluate the similarity of generalized assets.  If a reference configuration of 
known fitness is available, then the NCD allows one to complete a “universal” performance 
evaluation. 
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3 INTEGRITY GAMES 
3.1 Background 
3.1.1 Context 
 The time-evolution of generalized assets can be examined through many lenses.  
The theory of (general) dynamical systems provides the broadest scope, investigating all 
matters of dynamical behaviour.  Dynamical systems come in many “flavours”, with 
specific sub-fields dedicated to symbolic or arithmetic sequences, topologies, graphs, and 
other structures.  Emphasis is placed on answering important structure and existence 
questions.  A formal study may determine the particularities of reachability, stability and 
approximation.  The potential for various events, behaviours, boundary effects, asymptotic 
limits, and attractor (or repellor) regions is often sought.  The applications of dynamical 
systems theory have spawned entire fields, including coding theory, (optimal) control 
theory, and game theory, to name but a few [Picci and Gilliam, 1999]. 
 A survey of governance, management, planning, and control activities reveals that 
they are reducible to complex decision making.  These processes may involve concurrent, 
distributed action-selection, which can nonetheless be transformed into a time-sequential 
dynamical system.  Using information feedback, update-rules, and resource constraints, the 
decision process manifests itself as strings of symbols in some alphabet, walks over a tree, 
traversals over a graph, transitions between points in a space, or coverages of a set. 
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3.1.2 Terminology 
 When certain conditions are met, one has a particular type of dynamical system 
called an integrity game.  This definition of integrity game shares some of the notions used 
by other fields.  The most general terminology can be found in the literature on algebraic 
and symbolic dynamical systems theory.  Its subset, optimal control theory, is used 
predominantly in the applied sciences.  This terminology is relatively ubiquitous in process 
control and systems engineering, although many different formulations, modelling 
approaches, and solution techniques are in use [Picci and Gilliam, 1999], [Smolensky, 
1986].  Game theory matured in conjunction with these and other fields, but has since 
adopted its own terminology.  The game formulation is well-suited to problems in the social 
sciences, operations research, economics, business analytics, and computer science.  Game 
theory is a mature platform for a highly-studied variation of the common theme:  optimizing 
performance. 
 Table 3.1 outlines several of the prevalent terminologies encountered in game 
theory, control theory, and their parent, dynamical systems theory. 
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Table 3.1. Outline of terminology encountered by field of study. 
Terminology Game Theory Control Theory Dynamical Systems 
Systems 
Context 
– Game 
– Auction 
– Tournament 
– Plant 
– Process 
– Signal 
– Generalized Systems 
 
 
Representation of 
States 
– Fitness Landscape 
– Payoff Matrix 
– Decision Tree 
– State Space 
– Configuration Plot 
– Time/Frequency Domain 
– Phase Space 
– Phase Portrait 
– Geometric Manifold 
State Variables – Payoffs/Rewards 
– Costs/Risks 
– Utility 
– State-Variables 
– Costs/Errors 
– Gains/Losses 
– State-Variables 
– Functions/Measures 
– Penalty Gradients 
Source of 
Governing 
Dynamics 
– Players 
– Actors 
– Agents 
– Controls 
– Controllers 
– Forcing Functions 
– Evolution Functions 
– Potential Forms 
– Drifts/Exchanges 
Uncertainty & 
Feedback 
Mechanisms 
– Imperfect 
Information 
– Incomplete 
Information 
– Error Terms 
– Reference Signals 
– Partial Observability 
– Noise/Filters 
– Flows 
– Diffeomorphisms 
– End/Boundary Effects 
 
Traversals 
– Moves 
– Decisions 
– Actions 
– State-transitions 
– Controls 
– Paths 
– Evolutions 
– Propagations 
Sequence of State 
Visits 
– Strategies 
– Action Profiles 
– Policies – Trajectories 
– Orbits (ergodic) 
 
Criterion 
for 
Optimality 
– Minimax Strategy 
– Nash Equilibrium 
– Solution Refinements 
– Learning Rate 
– Optimal Policy 
– Adaptability 
– Stability 
– Transient Response 
– Asymptotic Behaviour 
– Lyapunov Stability 
– Basins of Attraction 
– Bounds/Limits 
– Conjugacy 
– Invariants 
 
Performance 
Objectives 
– Find optimal 
strategies. 
– Provide conditions 
for a win/loss 
– Find optimal policies 
– Design optimal 
controllers. 
 
– Describe potential 
behaviour and confine 
transfer functionals. 
 
 
Canonical 
Types 
– Combinatorial 
– Differential 
– Evolutionary 
– Stochastic 
– Quantum 
– Robust 
– Adaptive 
– Intelligent 
– Statistical 
– H-infinite 
– Measure-Preserving 
– Topological 
– Graphical 
– Symbolic 
– Sequential 
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3.1.3 Ontogenesis 
 Game theory extends aspects of decision theory and overlaps much of control 
theory.  In terms of decision-making, game-theory replaces the single-decider situation with 
multiple-players or rational agents.  In terms of control, game theory urges multi-controller 
design in the presence of intelligent adversaries.  This is sometimes the equivalent of 
developing a robust controller which defends against the expectation of worst-case 
behaviour.  Classical game theory goes further, by requiring the potential for dynamical 
processes to be equipped with intelligent behaviour derived from inductive inference and/or 
analytical look-ahead.  If the equivalent behaviour were formulated using the language of 
control theory, the underlying processes and filters might be classified as acausal and/or 
anti-causal.  Thus, in game-theory one is concerned with dynamics which can affect the 
state of the system through their conscious motivation.  In control theory, the opposing 
dynamics are implicitly naive. 
 Models based on game theory allow one to address risks (and risk sources) which 
are not only naive and stochastic (so-called harsh environments), but also superimposed 
with adversarial dynamics (so-called hostile environments).  Thus, where control theory 
often seeks to optimize asset performance in the face of a harsh environment, game theory 
seeks to satisfice asset performance in the face of hostile environments.  In terms of 
planning, game theory deals with purposeful, active performance denials, which subsume 
any accidental performance degradations. 
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 The theory of games has become central to artificial intelligence, search algorithms, 
and architectures for autonomous reasoning.  Modern game theory developed primarily out 
of research into operations research and mathematical economics.  It has origins with 
Zermelo (1913), Borel (1921), Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1928, 1944) and of course 
with Nash (1950).  From there, it expanded through Kuhn and Tucker (1951), Shapley 
(1953), Selten (1965, 1975), Conway (1970) and Smith (1972).  Major contributions 
followed in Harsanyi (1973, 1992), Rubenstein (1982), Mertens (1985), and van Damme 
(1993) [Dimand and Dimand, 2002].  More recently, investigations into the computational 
complexity of games (and their solutions) have been put forward by [Condon, 1992], 
[Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou, 2008], and [Chen et al., 2010].  Interest into the 
design of game-playing agents, as well as the combinatorial and algorithmic aspects of 
game solution concepts, has given rise to the field of algorithmic game theory.  Significant 
progress in this area has been made by authors such as Koller, Nisan, Roughgarden, and 
Tardos, among others [Nisan et al., 2007]. 
 
3.1.4 Classification 
 An integrity game constitutes a deterministic base game which is perturbed in a 
nondeterministic manner.  In the present work, we consider only a restricted class of base 
games and perturbative effects.   
 The base game is taken to be a standard combinatorial game.  This represents a 
sequential game where players alternate turns.  On their respective turns, players choose to 
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transition the game into a new state, and receive an immediate fixed reward.  This is done 
by selecting amongst a static, finite set of discrete actions.  This process is repeated until 
termination criteria are met.  Such games can be solved using the minimax theorem and by 
adversarial search algorithms [Hauk, Buro, and Schaeffer, 2006]. 
 The perturbed game results when stochastic effects, such as noise, errors, trembles 
of hand (imperfect actions), and partial observability (incomplete information) come into 
play.  Insufficient assumptions regarding opponent beliefs, rules, or number of players can 
also play a role.  This alters the structure of the base game by essentially corrupting inputs 
and state evaluations, partially randomizing state-transitions, and modifying payoffs.  Such 
games can be approximately solved using generative model discovery, reinforcement 
learning, and sampling based algorithms [Bowling and Veloso, 2000]. 
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3.2 The Base Game 
3.2.1 Specifications 
 A base game can be specified in one of several forms. An extensive-form game 
organizes the sequence of player decisions or moves into a decision tree.  The extensive-
form efficiently captures the choices at every decision point, including chance events from 
nature. A normal-form or strategic-form game describes strategy spaces and rewards by 
way of a payoff matrix. This organization is useful for games where decisions are 
simultaneous or premeditated before play occurs. The normal-form can also represent a 
degenerate case of extensive-form. When information feedback between sequential choices 
is minimal, the situation is effectively simultaneous.  Furthermore, every extensive-form 
game can be transformed into a unique normal-form representation.  However, the converse 
is not necessarily true.  A normal-form game may admit multiple extensive forms.  
Converting an extensive-form game into a normal-form may require an exponential blow 
up in the size of the payoffs [Bowling and Veloso, 2000]. 
 Finally, there is the succinct-form, which is the specification we adopt for the 
current version of our planning architecture.  Succinct-form games lend themselves well to 
computational exploitation via symmetry and induction (e.g. transposition and refutation 
tables) [Schoenebeck and Vadhan, 2006], and [Fortnow et al., 2005]. 
 Definitions found in this sub-section have been adapted from the works of [Brown 
and Shoham, 2008].  These authors follow a standard notation which has been used 
elsewhere in the literature on games. 
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3.2.2 Extensive Form 
 Much of the game-theoretic terminology is defined for extensive-form games.  
Specifying a game in extensive form has many useful applications.  A brief discussion of 
their framework is therefore necessary.  Formally, a finite extensive-form game consists 
of: 
 A finite set of players 𝐼 = {1,2,..., 𝑖}; 
 A finite set of nodes 𝑋 that form a rooted tree, with a labelled root node 𝑥0 ∈ 𝑋, and a 
set of terminal nodes 𝑍 ⊂ 𝑋; 
 A set of transition functions that describe for each non-terminal node: 
 The player 𝑖(𝑥)who moves at 𝑥; 
 The set A(x) of possible actions at x. 
 The successor node n(x,a) resulting from action a. 
 Payoff functions for each player which assign payoffs to players as a function of the 
terminal node reached 𝑢𝑖:𝑍 → ℝ; 
 An information partition ℎ(𝑥) which defines for each node 𝑥, the set of nodes that are 
possible given what player 𝑖(𝑥) knows. Thus, if the node 𝑥′is known to be reachable 
from the current node 𝑥, or 𝑥′ ∈ ℎ(𝑥), then the player 𝑖moving at node 𝑥, or𝑖(𝑥), can 
be the same player moving at node 𝑥′.  It follows that if 𝑥′ ∈ ℎ(𝑥), then 
𝑖(𝑥′)=𝑖(𝑥),𝐴(𝑥′)=𝐴(𝑥), and ℎ(𝑥′)=ℎ(𝑥); 
 The set of information sets available when player i moves from position x: 𝐻𝑖={𝑆 ⊂
𝑋: 𝑆=ℎ(𝑥) ∣ ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑖(𝑥)=𝑖}; 
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 The set Ai of actions available to i at any of his information sets ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑖. 
3.2.3 Normal-Form 
A game in normal-form is a structure Γ=⟨𝑁, 𝑆, 𝐹⟩, where: 
 𝑁 = {1,2,..., 𝑛} is a finite set of players; 
 𝑆 = {𝑆1,𝑆2,..., 𝑆𝑛} is an n-tuple of pure strategy sets, one for each player; 
 𝐹 = {𝐹1,𝐹2,..., 𝐹𝑛} is a tuple of payoff functions, one for each player which maps 
strategies to rewards. 
This definition has been included for completion.  Normal-form games are conceptually 
useful for identifying certain equilibria, but require additional computational overhead for 
more refined solutions.  For efficiently solving integrity games, they rank below their more 
preferred succinct-form (most ideal) as well as their extensive-form counterparts.  Hence, 
further discussion regarding this type of game specification is omitted. 
3.2.4 Succinct-Form 
 Games in succinct-form often allow for smaller representations than normal-form. 
Describing a game of 𝑛 players, each facing 𝑠 strategies, requires a listing of 𝑛𝑠𝑛 utility 
values. In games where symmetry (of information, actions, strategies, payoffs, etc.) is 
exploited, a combinatorial reduction in the number of utility values is possible [Fortnow, 
2005]. 
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 For 2-player integrity games, the base game can be succinctly modelled by 𝑛2 utility 
values, where 𝑛 in this case is the maximum number of moves, actions, choices, or state-
transitions possible at any round.  The succinct-form directly coincides with the 
𝐾(𝑣,𝑒,𝑛)asset representation discussed in Sections  
Special Graphs and The 𝑲(𝟏,𝟐,𝑵)Asset Representation.  For 2-players, 𝐾(1,2,𝑁) forms a base 
integrity game in succinct-form.  This specification is defined by 𝑁2 utility values (one for 
each potential state-transition), usually given by some 𝑁 ×𝑁 weighted adjacency matrix. 
 
3.2.5 Strategies 
3.2.5.1 Pure Strategies 
 A pure strategy for player 𝑖 in an extensive-form game is a function 𝑠𝑖  : 𝐻𝑖 → 𝐴𝑖 
such that 𝑠𝑖(ℎ) ∈ 𝐴(ℎ) for each ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑖. A strategy is a complete plan explaining what a 
player will do in every situation. It represents a sequence of action selections.  Let 𝑆𝑖 denote 
the set of pure strategies available to player 𝑖, and let 𝑆={𝑆1 × 𝑆2 × ... × 𝑆𝐼} denote the set 
of pure strategy profiles ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼. Similarly, let the set 𝑠=(𝑠1,..., 𝑠𝐼) denote a particular 
strategy profile, and let 𝑠−𝑖denote the strategies of 𝑖′𝑠opponents. 
3.2.5.2 Mixed Strategies 
 In an extensive-form game, a mixed strategy 𝜎𝑖 for player 𝑖 is a probability 
distribution 𝛥 over the set of 𝑖′𝑠 pure strategies 𝑆𝑖, or 𝜎𝑖 ∈ 𝛥(𝑆𝑖). 
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3.2.5.3 Behavioural Strategies 
 A behavioural strategy for player i in an extensive-form game is a function σ𝑖:𝐻𝑖 →
Δ(𝐴𝑖) such that 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡(σ𝑖(ℎ)) ⊂ 𝐴(ℎ), ∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑖. 
3.2.5.4 Kuhn's Theorem and Perfect Recall 
 A classic result in game theory, known as Kuhn's Theorem, states that in a game of 
perfect recall, i.e. where players may remember all their previous moves/states as well as 
their previously encountered information sets, then for any mixed strategy there is an 
equivalent behavioural strategy.  Thus, these terms are often used interchangeably. 
3.2.6 Solution Concepts 
 In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will 
be played [Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008].  These predictions describe which strategies 
will be adopted by rational agents, and therefore constitute a “solution” for the result of the 
game. 
3.2.6.1 Nash Equilibrium (NE) 
 Recall that 𝑆={𝑆1 × 𝑆2 × ... × 𝑆𝐼} is the set of pure strategy profiles, with 𝑆𝑖∈𝐼 ∈ 𝑆 
the set of all profiles for player 𝑖. The resultant payoff function for some strategy profile𝑠 ∈
𝑆 is given by 𝑓=(𝑓1(𝑠),..., 𝑓𝐼(𝑠)). Also recall that 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠−𝑖 denote the strategy profiles for 
player 𝑖and all of his opponents, respectively. The payoff function f depends entirely on the 
strategy profile𝑠, which represents the strategy chosen by player 𝑖 as well as all the other 
players −𝑖. 
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 A strategy profile 𝑠* ∈ 𝑆 is said to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if no unilateral 
deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that player.  Formally, NE → 
∀𝑖, 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖:𝑓𝑖(𝑠𝑖
*, 𝑠−𝑖
* ) ⩾ 𝑓𝑖(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠−𝑖
* ). When this inequality holds strict for all players, the 
Nash Equilibrium is said to be strict. When ∃𝑠𝑖
* ∈ 𝑆𝑖:𝑓𝑖(𝑠𝑖
*, 𝑠−𝑖
* ) = 𝑓𝑖(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠−𝑖
* ), the Nash 
Equilibrium is said to be weak.  NE can exist for either pure or mixed strategies.  In 1951, 
Nash showed that for every game with a finite number of players, in which every player 
can choose from finitely many pure strategies, there must exist at least one (possibly mixed) 
Nash Equilibrium [Nash, 1950].  As a solution concept, NE is more commonly found within 
the context of normal-form games. 
3.2.6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) 
 This solution concept is a refinement (or subset) of the classical Nash Equilibrium.  
Refinements enforce stricter conditions on the optimality of behaviour, and impose greater 
requirements on the rationality of players.  Subgame perfection posits that players will 
always seek a Nash Equilibrium going forward even if some off-equilibrium play was 
observed.  By definition, a subgame Γ′of some extensive-form game Γ, consists of: 
 A subset 𝑌of the set of nodes 𝑋, where 𝑌 is rooted by a single non-terminal 
node 𝑥, and contains all of 𝑥′𝑠 successors, and; 
 Y  has the property that if  𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 and 𝑦′ ∈ ℎ(𝑦) then 𝑦′ ∈ 𝑌; 
 Γ′ shares the same information sets, feasible moves, and payoffs at terminal 
nodes as Γ. 
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Subgame perfect equilibrium therefore prescribes a NE to be played at each subgame. As 
a solution concept, SPE is more commonly associated within the context of extensive-form 
games. 
3.2.6.3 Minimax Theorems 
 In their most general form, minimax theorems are fixed-point theorems from 
variational analysis [Ricceri and Simons, 1998].   Under broad conditions, a dynamical 
system, and hence most game structures, will admit an approximately stable saddle region.  
The saddle is effectively a fixed-point solution to the game (or dynamical system) which 
can be found using various techniques [Ricceri and Simons, 1998]. 
A particular example is known as the max-min inequality.  Given a real-valued 
function over some cross-product of compact vector spaces, 𝑓: 𝑋 × 𝑌 → 𝑅: 
 sup
𝑥
 inf 
𝑦
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ inf 
𝑦
sup
𝑥
 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) 3.1 
Which holds ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ. In 1928, Von Neumann studied the problem of solving 
“games of strategy” (gesellschaftsspiel), and produced the following result, known as the 
Von Neumann Minimax Theorem (VNMM): 
 𝑣 = min
𝑋
 max 
𝑌
𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑌 = max 
𝑌
min 
𝑋
𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑌 3.2 
Where v is called the value of the game, 𝑋, 𝑌are the mixed strategy solutions for players 
Min and Max, and A is the payoff matrix of the game in normal-form. 
 Along with NE, the VNMM is one of the most fundamental theorems of game 
theory.  It states that every finite, two-player, zero-sum game (2PZSG) must possess 
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optimal mixed strategies.  This optimality is achieved under minimax conditions and is 
known as the value of the game.  Proofs can be found in the original papers [Von Neumann, 
1928], [Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. 
3.2.7 Transformed Minimax Potential 
 Any finite N-player general-sum game (NPGSG) can be transformed into an 
equivalent (N+1)-player zero-sum game, or (N+1)ZSG.  This can be achieved by invoking 
an arbitrator or referee player [Cai and Daskalakis, 2012].  This process creates a global 
potential function out of the rewards or payoffs, summing them to zero.  Additionally, 
strictly competitive situations can be partitioned, where a single player is isolated from the 
remaining contingent of players.  This contingent forms an aggregate non-cooperative force 
[Cai and Daskalakis, 2012].  The combination of these transformations can reduce many 
situations into an equivalent set of problems which are more readily solved.  We summarize 
this process by the following implication diagram(s); NPGSG → (N+1)ZSG → 2PZSG*. 
The resulting game, 2PZSG*, is also called the transformed minimax potential of 
the game (or dynamical system).  Structurally, this is a finite, two-player zero-sum game 
where the payoffs follow a potential reward function that attenuates (or discounts) in long-
run expectation towards zero.  The two players are the net resultants of a binary partition, 
condensation, or mean-field approximation of the actors.  They represent a duality of 
forces, the Minimizer and the Maximizer, or MIN and MAX.  These players seek to strictly 
oppose one another in perfect competition.  Each player has the fundamental objective of 
minimizing (or maximizing) their respective payoffs. 
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 In 2PZSG*, payoffs are typically captured by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility 
function (VNM-Utility).  These payoffs are complete, transitive, monotonic, and 
necessarily risk-averse [Bergstrom, 2014].  It is presumed that agents will seek to maximize 
(or minimize) their long run expected VNM-utility.  This is both an admissible criterion for 
decision making, as well as a notion of rationality between agents [Bergstrom, 2014].  Both 
VNM-utility and VNM-rationality are considered somewhat artificial, as humans are rarely 
capable of this behaviour [Kreps, 1988].  Furthermore, this so-called VNM-behaviour is 
seldom observed in practice [Kreps, 1988].  By default, we will assume that in 2PZSG and 
2PZSG* players attempt to adopt VNM-like behaviour.  
When the transformed minimax potential respects VNM-behaviour, several 
solution concepts become equivalent.  The problem of finding a minimax solution is called 
MINIMAX, and the problem of finding a maximin solution is called MAXIMIN.  These 
concepts also have dual representations in linear programming, where finding a solution is 
called LP.  The problem of finding a pure strategy NE is called NASH, although sometimes 
the mixed strategy NE are used interchangeably [Nihan, Roughgarden, et al., 2007].  It can 
be shown that for any symmetric 2PZSG, and by proxy any 2PZSG*, the following 
implication is true; MINIMAX = MAXIMIN = NASH = LP. 
Additionally, if more than one optimal mixed strategy exists, then there are 
infinitely many optimal mixed strategies [Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008].  At least one 
pure strategy solution (such as a NE) is guaranteed to exist, and there may exist several 
pure strategy solutions.  For a thorough discussion of these results equipped with proofs, 
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the reader may again be diverted to the works of [Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008] and 
[Nihan, Roughgarden, et al., 2007].    
 While not always valid or appropriate, the 2PZSG*, or transformed minimax 
potential, is a reduction which allows for simplified analysis.  It consequently assumes 
VNM-behaviour in utility and rationality.  As a zero-sum potential game, it maintains the 
notion that one player's gains are balanced by losses to the other players as a whole.  In the 
two-player sense, this yields values for the game which can be seen as saddle-point 
solutions.  These transcend the game specification; as Nash Equilibria in normal-form 
games, principal variations in extensive-form games, or minimax trajectories for succinct-
games. 
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3.3 The Perturbed Game 
3.3.1 Specifications 
 As with its base game counterpart, a perturbed game can be specified in one of 
several formats.  However, there is less interchangeability between specifications and 
solution concepts for perturbed games [Jackson et al., 2011].  Since we are dealing with 
sequential planning of generalized assets, only the extensive-form variation of perturbed 
games will be covered.  We will later adapt extensive-form solutions to a succinct-form as 
part of an overall model for solving integrity games. 
 
3.3.2 Perturbations of the Base Game 
 Let Γ be a standard extensive-form base game as defined in Section Extensive Form.  
A perturbed game ~Γ is a copy of the base game where every pure strategy is played with 
non-zero probability. Thus ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, ∀𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖) ≥ 0, and ~Γ can be interpreted as a 
restriction on playing only totally mixed strategies σ𝑖 ∈ Δ(𝑆𝑖). 
In their most basic form, perturbations to the base game structure result in all 
strategies (i.e. sequences of actions) being “on the table” without regard to how sub-optimal 
they may be.  A dominated strategy in the base game is technically feasible throughout the 
perturbed game.  There are several reasons for advocating that strategies be totally mixed 
[Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008].  The examination of perturbed gameplay (over some 
base game) is a common technique for assessing the stability and robustness of equilibrium 
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solutions to noise.  Perturbations also capture modelling errors, misjudgment of states and 
beliefs, as well as behavioural imperfections. A summary of these motivating factors is 
presented in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2. Sources of Perturbation to the Base Game 
Nomenclature Source Class Effects(s) 
 
Incomplete 
Information 
 
– Partially-Observable 
States. 
– Unknown/Uncertain 
Player Motivations. 
– Misinterpretation of game state. 
– Errors in utility and payoff functions. 
– Uncertainty in opponent beliefs, motives, available 
actions. 
– Emergence of unexpected patterns. 
Imperfect 
Actions 
– Non-deterministic 
Actions and/or Selection 
Mechanisms. 
– Control Costs. 
– Incorrect moves and/or improper action-selection, 
despite perception of correctness. 
– Deviations from expected state-transitions and/or 
payoff results. 
Misc. 
Modelling 
Errors 
– Unknown Actors, Rules, 
Environments. 
– Approximating 
Assumptions. 
– Infeasible or unable to 
capture real-world 
complexity. 
– Misrepresentation of the situation through incorrect 
(imprecise, inaccurate) game structures. 
– Incorrect, contracted, or insufficient analysis. 
– Sub-optimal or even massively detrimental decision 
making. 
 
 The study of perturbed games leads to several refinements in the interpretation and 
prediction of rationally “correct” play.  These refinements are often motivated by 
arguments from admissibility.  Admissibility criteria require decision rules which are not 
dominated by alternatives in the sense of some estimator such as Bayesian expectation or 
some coherent risk/loss function [Kreps, 1988], [Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008].  For 
two-player games, admissibility implies that no strategy 𝑠𝐴 that is (weakly) dominated by 
another strategy 𝑠𝐵 is legally allowed to be played.   
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That is, for any player 𝑖, a strategy 𝑠* ∈ 𝑆𝑖: 
 Weakly dominates another strategy 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑆𝑖, if ∀𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖{𝑢𝑖(𝑠
*, 𝑠−𝑖) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑠′, 𝑠−𝑖)} ∧
{∃𝑠−𝑖:𝑢𝑖(𝑠
*, 𝑠−𝑖) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑠′, 𝑠−𝑖)}; 
 Strictly dominates another strategy 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑆𝑖, if ∀𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖{𝑢𝑖(𝑠
*, 𝑠−𝑖) > 𝑢𝑖(𝑠′, 𝑠−𝑖)}. 
In perturbed games, the standard solution concepts seek to implement strategies which 
tolerate deviations from base game equilibrium behaviour (such as NASH or MINIMAX).  
The limits of this tolerance typically involve some notion of admissibility, or remaining 
undominated in the face of perturbations.  Refinements may also be defined from other 
desirable properties, such as the preservation of inherited inference, or by way of 
forward/backward induction.  This has led to increasingly stronger refinements over the 
subgame perfect equilibrium.  Examples include the sequential equilibrium proposed by 
[Kreps and Wilson, 1982], as well as the proper equilibrium of Myerson, the Markov 
perfect equilibrium, and the concept of Mertens Stability [Nisan, Roughgarden, et al., 
2007]. 
3.3.3 Extensive-Form Trembling Hand Perfection 
 One of the most significant refinements is the trembling hand perfect equilibrium, 
a solution concept first proposed by Selten (1975).  Trembling hand perfect equilibrium 
takes into account the possibility for deviations from equilibrium as a result of “trembling 
hands”.  Under this regime, players have perfect recall of their previous actions, but fumble 
certain individual moves, and may (with small probability) choose unintended strategies 
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for the remainder of the game.  There are differing, incomparable notions of normal-form 
and extensive-form trembling hand equilibria [Jackson et al., 2011]. 
 Formally, a (mixed or behavioural) strategy profile 𝜎 is an 𝜖 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 equilibrium 
iff it assigns strictly positive probability to all pure strategies, and only pure strategies that 
are best replies get probability greater than𝜖.  A (mixed or behavioural) strategy profile𝜎is 
then an extensive-form trembling-hand perfect equilibrium iff it is the limit point of a 
sequence of 𝜖 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡equilibria with 𝜖 → 0+. 
 The notion of 𝜖 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 equilibrium maintains that for mild perturbations of the 
information sets away from the complete information of the base game, one can expect 
correspondingly mild perturbations in best reply behaviour. Through trembling hand 
perfect equilibrium, one may recover any subgame perfect equilibria which vanished as a 
result of perturbations less than 𝜖. To do so, it merely assumes “perfection” (or optimality) 
in the sequential responses to successive perturbations of the game structure. 
 
3.3.4 Robustness, Stability, and Adaptability Concepts 
 It is worth noting that in perturbed games, players can be better off by ignoring 
some of the information potentially available to them [Jackson et al., 2007].  For real-world 
assets, players typically incur additional control costs to gain knowledge or refine their 
beliefs of the asset-environment system.  For example, paying (e.g. trading energy) to 
reduce the uncertainty and/or noise associated with an observation, shaping an inspection 
to be of higher fidelity, or forcing probabilistic guarantees on a maintenance action.  In 
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such cases, the relationship between the value of ϵ and the expected equilibrium payoffs 
can have profound effects.  There can exist correspondences between ϵ, σ, and 𝑢, where all 
players benefit from relaxing their knowledge of the game structure.  This can be 
understood as having players face the costs of discovering information vs. the costs of fully 
tailoring strategies to imperfect information, such as ϵ − 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 uncertainty 
tresholds.  This is in addition to the other justifications (c.f. Table 3.2) that are based on 
players (or the modeler) incorrectly perceiving states, actions or payoffs. 
 Approaches based on this model vary, but are broadly referred to as ϵ − 𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 or 
ϵ − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 methods.  These methods essentially seek large basins of attraction, which are 
considered to be of lower risk and more preferable then narrow yet higher-performing 
corridors of play.  They emphasize state-transition trajectories which remain stable 
(minimal variance) as the risk landscape is perturbed.  They also anticipate robust and 
securable payoffs in the face of uncertain information.  This is in contrast to the principles 
behind the so-called adaptive methods, which seek to continuously exploit discernable 
changes in the game structure.  Adaptive methods expropriate feedback, and the belief that 
other players possess fewer computational resources and/or will exhibit fewer information 
gains as the game evolves.  Roughly speaking, adaptive methods are appropriate when 
opponents will make many more “mistakes”, and these mistakes will be noticed and can be 
exploited.  A detailed, formal treatment of these ideas can be found in [Bowling and Veloso, 
2000]. 
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 To recapitulate, solution concepts which are adaptive work well in asymmetric 
games, where (i.) some players have an inherent structural advantage from which to launch 
adaptive strategies, and (ii.) perturbations preserve this asymmetry overall (and hence the 
advantage).  In these games, several opponents may be considered to have significantly 
greater (or fewer) resources.  There may also be more (or less) information available at 
each round, or some subset of players must pay more (or less) for it.  The disadvantaged 
players may also possess greater uncertainty in their knowledge of states and actions.  They 
may be restricted in their action sets and possibly subject to move penalties.  Disadvantaged 
players may also exhibit irrational behaviour through access to fewer computational 
resources or some natural disposition towards sub-optimality. 
 This asymmetry is sometimes indirectly captured parametrically by γ ∈ [0,1], 
which expresses the level of non-cooperation present in the game structures Γor ~Γ. When 
γ is small, the level of competition is small.  The parameter γ can also be interpreted as a 
hostility index for the environment. 
 Limiting the ruleset (i.e. the resources and actions available to players) may 
handicap even the most diligent and computationally rational opponents.  When the game 
structures Γ or ~Γ are sufficiently asymmetric, the opportunity for strategic potency is likely 
to be reduced. This corresponds to a significant shift in the location of saddle-point 
equilibria or even their complete degeneration (c.f. games with no value [Sion and Wolfe, 
1957]).  As γ → 0, the asymmetry and resulting discrepancy between player abilities is 
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maximized (in expectation). At this point it may make sense to relax the assumption of 
adversarial dynamics completely, reducing the game to that of a one-player optimal 
stochastic control problem [Filar and Vrieze, 1997].  In these circumstances, small or even 
time-dynamic values of γ appreciably close to zero will emphasize solutions which 
anticipate stochastic deviations, and attempt to classify environment types by their 
generating distribution(s).  These conditions are ripe for adaptive techniques, which will 
inevitably exploit discovered asymmetries and increase the overall game performance, as 
it represents planning under naive environments. 
 As 𝛾 → 1 we achieve symmetry and opponents are considered strictly competitive. 
This represents the situation of intelligent adversaries with full-scale resources, equivalent 
rulesets, and equal-and-opposite objectives.  In these circumstances, solution concepts 
based on stability and robustness are preferred.  Thus for large values of 𝛾, we seek 
trajectories which are designed to survive against, or in an evolutionary sense avoid 
disappointment, regret, or invasion by, any reasonable perturbations of the landscape.  For 
extensive-form games, this leads to the acceptance of trembling-hand perfect (or 𝜖 −
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 equivalent) equilibrium solutions over their adaptive counterparts.  For 
sequentially perturbed base games, this approach remains valid insofar as inductive 
inference is preserved.  It can be shown that backwards induction is preserved for games of 
perfect recall, as well as for games with the Markov property [Filar and Vrieze, 1997]. 
 In perfect recall games, a complete history of state-transitions is available and in 
the worst-case ex ante responses to perturbations are admissible.  In Markov games, future 
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state-transitions are history independent and depend on the current state (i.e. memoryless).  
In both cases, induction can be applied, yielding a set of appropriately stable and/or robust 
equilibrium solutions.  This is often accomplished via a variant of minimax search over the 
fitness of outcomes; e.g. taking into account the probabilistic “quality” of expected 
outcomes by evaluating moments such as the mean and standard deviation [Cai and 
Daskalakis, 2012]. 
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3.4 A Succinct Integrity Game for Generalized Assets 
3.4.1 Problem Description 
 Consider the situation of an asset manager responsible for making decisions 
regarding the performance and utilization of a generalized asset.  The generalized asset can 
be of any type, but consider for the moment a graph-defined state-transition system.  
Several graph performance indicators have been used to construct a series of reference 
configurations for the asset.  These configurations have been ranked according to their 
overall fitness level and partitioned by equivalence class. The asset manager has determined 
the utility generated by maintaining the asset near a particular configuration for an entire 
time-step.  Using the normalized compression distance as a similarity metric, the costs of 
transforming configurations are deducted from the utility.  This forms an integrity score, 
which represents the net payoffs or rewards from transitioning between the asset reference 
configurations, labelled as integrity states. 
 The problem facing the asset manager is how to optimize the performance of the 
asset in the absence of any additional information.  No domain knowledge is available, and 
the coupled asset-environment system is considered sufficiently novel and complex so as 
to rule out the feasibility of using expert assessments.  Where possible, procedures which 
“learn” to filter unwanted noise have already been applied.  Any process of reducing 
uncertainty is bounded and converges long after the asset is expected to be operational.  
The design lifetime of the asset is unspecified but known to be finite.  The asset is expected 
to persist in an unknown but hostile environment throughout lifecycle.  Environmental 
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effects include bounded stochastic integrity disruptions as well adversarial dynamics.  The 
asset is deemed sufficiently important to warrant the attentions of intelligent opponents, 
about which very little is known in terms of resources and/or capabilities. 
 The asset manager is tasked with formulating state-transition plans which maximize 
the integrity score over some long-run sequence of time-steps.  This ultimately corresponds 
to navigating a dynamic integrity landscape with the objectives of maximizing utility while 
minimizing risks.  Translated, the asset manager must prescribe state-transition trajectories 
which pursue desirable configurations while avoiding unwanted ones.  Furthermore, these 
trajectories must be optimal in that over-time, they accumulate the greatest possible 
integrity score in the presence of perturbations owing to noise, modelling errors, and 
unforeseen deviations. 
 Before the asset is made operational, a series of expected long-run average integrity 
scores are given as payoffs to a base game in succinct-form.  The succinct-form integrity 
scores correspond to an array of length quadratic in the number of distinct integrity states.  
For simplicity, these scores are positive integers.  At each time-step, the asset is monitored 
and noisy data regarding its configuration are extracted.  The expected integrity scores for 
the remainder of the game are evaluated, with one score assigned to each potential one-
time-step state-transition.  The array is then updated and given to the asset manager for 
analysis, planning, and governance. 
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3.4.2 Formulation 
 This problem is correctly modelled as a sequentially perturbed two-player zero-sum 
game (~2PZSG).  In the worst-case, all actors (including the environment) conspire against 
the asset manager.  Since this scenario is not explicitly ruled out, we can generate a 
transformed minimax potential resulting in a 2PZSG* base game with perturbations 
arriving at each time-step.  This requires a certain amount of symmetry in the game 
structure and posits Von-Neumann behaviour (VNM-rationality, VNM-utility).  We must 
naively assume the capabilities of all agents are approximately equal (at least in long-run 
expectation), thereby massaging the game into ~2PZSG* form. 
 Because the asset evolves forward in time and partial information feedback is 
present, we presume an ordering of moves.  Therefore, any simultaneous play is 
“accidental” and a normal-form specification would be inappropriate.  While extensive-
form is applicable, the problem suggests the use of succinct representations which are 
updated at each time-step.  With no explicit move ordering given, we may assume two 
scenarios:  (i) the asset manager has at his disposal the “first-move” in which a starting state 
can be specified and decided, and (ii.) the adversary decides the initial state of the problem.  
Since the initial design of the asset is very likely to be stipulated in advance, the base game 
is assumed to commence with the asset manager having already made the “zeroth move”.  
Ideally, we would seek methods for a rapid analysis from any/all start state(s) to any/all 
end state(s). 
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 In the next chapter, we detail a working model and provide algorithms for this entire 
problem.  In the Appendices, we provide several engineering-related examples.  These 
examples illustrate the process of problem formulation and analysis using the 
aforementioned methods. 
3.4.3 Preliminary Analysis 
 The ~2PZSG* class efficiently models the generalized asset integrity problem.  
These “succinct integrity games” can be analyzed by taking the limits of the game structure.  
This can be done with respect to several properties including the robustness, stability, and 
adaptability concepts outlined in section 3.3.4.   
For this purpose, one may consider the adversarial index γ, which represents the 
degree of non-cooperation in the actions of the opponent and/or environment.  This 
parameter expresses the qualitative risk(s) of deviating from equilibrium play in lieu of 
incomplete beliefs, irrational behaviour, model deterioration, mistake probabilities, and/or 
errors incurred by computational and/or analytical limitations.  By deviation risk we mean 
the product of the frequency and intensity of deviations from nondeterministic best-
response behaviour (optimality conditions).  By itself, γ captures the environmental 
severity, look-ahead, and overall competitive intelligence.  For small values of γ, the 
environment is naive and harsh, while for large values it is adversarial or hostile.  
Alternatively, 1 γ⁄  can be thought of as a measure of random move generation on behalf of 
the environment. 
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The payoff perturbation threshold ϵ𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠,𝑚𝑎𝑥, expresses an asymptotic upper 
bound in the magnitude of one-stage deviations to the payoff functions.  For simplicity we 
will write ϵ = ϵ𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠,𝑚𝑎𝑥 and let 𝑢𝑘 be some payoff function which maps state-
transitions to utility values.  Let (𝑣𝑠, 𝑣𝑡)denote a transition as a source-destination pair of 
states.  Then the resulting map 𝑢𝑘:(𝑣𝑠, 𝑣𝑡) gives the integrity score awarded immediately 
after transitioning from integrity level 𝑣𝑠 to 𝑣𝑡 at the end of time step 𝑘. The perturbation 
threshold 𝜖 therefore sets the absolute minimum and maximum one-stage payoff deviation 
limits. So for 𝑢𝑘+1 :(𝑣𝑠, 𝑣𝑡), we have 𝑢𝑘 − 𝜖 ≤ 𝑢𝑘+1 ≤ 𝑢𝑘 + 𝜖. 
The average signal-to-noise ratio 𝐷𝑠𝑛 = 𝜇𝑢𝜇𝜖, expresses the degree of 
pronunciation and discernibility in the average payoffs 𝜇𝑢 with respect to the average 
perturbations in payoffs 𝜇𝜖.  When perturbation thresholds exceed payoffs, there is very 
little controllability over game outcomes and the effects of the adversarial index are 
reduced.  When perturbations vanish, the payoffs remain effectively fixed and the 
adversarial index dominates any decision making.  Thus 𝐷𝑠𝑛 affects the long-run sensitivity 
of the base game 𝛤to changes in 𝛾 and 𝜖.  We note that 𝐷𝑠𝑛 drives the interval limits of 
dynamic range for perturbed games: ~Γ𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐷𝑠𝑛) ≤ ~Γ(𝑢, γ, ϵ) ≤ ~Γ𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐷𝑠𝑛). 
Variability in these game parameters entices an examination of several limit cases.  For a 
brief analysis, we consider the succinct integrity game structure ~Γ(𝑢, γ, ϵ), and supply it 
with four boundary scenarios. 
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3.4.3.1 Scenario 1:  𝛄 → 𝟎,
𝛜
𝒖
→ 𝟎 
 In this scenario there is a total lack of competition.  Additionally, the effects of 
payoff changes are vanishingly small.  The only integrity antagonists are the naive effects 
of a stochastic environment.  This situation allows for a direct stochastic optimization.  
Depending on the context, the objective is to find the minimum or maximum of some 
function of the payoffs 𝑢, subject to interval constraints.  Without adversarial resistance or 
payoff perturbations, VNM-behaviour on the part of the asset manager is trivial to maintain.  
This VNM-behaviour as a criterion, is akin to recognizing that many versions of this 
problem are frequently treated (or posed) in a manner that are convex [Schoenebeck and 
Vadhan, 2006].   
At each time interval, the asset manager selects the action which offers the highest 
long-run (possibly discounted) expected payoff in the base game. This process continues 
indefinitely or until termination criteria are met. 
3.4.3.2 Scenario 2:  𝛄 → 𝟎,
𝛜
𝒖
→ ∞ 
 This scenario arises when the process of integrity degradations emanates from non-
competitive sources.  However, in this case the effects of noisy payoffs are made 
appreciably large.  The problem statement emphasizes that for large perturbations, any 
filtering or learning of the payoffs cannot be accomplished within a finite horizon setting.  
Under these conditions, the signal-to-noise ratio approaches zero, and there is no control 
over the payoff structure.  Any strategic consistency is based on random play (the ability 
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to conjunction form of true random play).  In this scenario, the net costs of integrity 
restorations will be essentially random.  The asset will generate a long-run utility as a 
function of the stochastically realized state-transition sequence. 
3.4.3.3 Scenario 3:  𝜸 → 𝟏,
𝝐
𝒖
→ 𝟎 
 In this limit case, the adversarial index tends towards one while simultaneously 
maintaining a maximal signal-to-noise ratio.  The asset integrity score is actively denied 
under perfect competition from an intelligent opponent.  With vanishingly small noise 
effects, the situation becomes one of deterministic 2PZSG dynamics.  A suitable Nash 
equilibrium, minimax trajectory, or principal variation will always exist.  If each player is 
guaranteed to: (i.) play perfectly (in a deterministic sense), (ii.) possesses equal and 
opposite beliefs, actions, and utility payoffs (i.e. complete game symmetry), then this 
solution concept forms what is essentially a “nemesis contract” between players. 
3.4.3.4 Scenario 4:  𝛄 → 𝟏,
𝛜
𝒖
→ ∞ 
 Here, the adversarial index approaches one while the magnitude of the perturbations 
greatly exceed the payoffs.  The environment again consists of intelligent adversaries.  
These antagonists compete with the asset manager to deny any long run expected utility 
generated by the asset.  This process is manifested by an opposition to any accumulation 
of the integrity score.  However, the presence of uncontrollably large noise effects ensure 
the state-transition sequences will be realized non-deterministically.  Since learning the 
generating distribution for the noise effects is strictly unreliable, both players are again 
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forced to play a kind of the sequential best-response equilibrium.  The resulting game 
dynamics involve piecewise strategy reformulations through ongoing replanning and 
adaptation at each round, or when applicable (e.g. viz change-detection).  This situation 
results in sequential re-evaluations of the expected minimax trajectory or principal 
variation.  When adaptive techniques and/or learning routines are available, convergence 
to some initially unknown generating function of the perturbations may be possible.  In this 
case, the asset manager may form a set of beliefs which affect trajectory assessments.  
These are based on estimates of the historical, current, and future integrity states.  Based 
on the proximity to termination criteria (such as failure risks or resource expenditures), the 
asset manager will prescribe an immediate action with concern for short-term survival and 
long-run security.  In this scenario, the net costs of integrity restorations will be essentially 
random.  The asset will generate a long-run utility as a function of the stochastically realized 
state-transition sequence. 
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3.5 Conspectus 
 This chapter presented a self-contained review of several game-theoretic concepts.  
A brief summary of the background, context, and terminology was provided in order to 
relate game-theory to the theory of control and general dynamical systems.  An ontogenesis 
and classification of various game studies was undertaken in order to demonstrate a 
thorough literature review of the subject matter.  This chapter emphasized two major game 
structures, namely a base game and a perturbed game.  For each game type, the overall 
structure and its representation were discussed.  An outline for the normal-form, extensive-
form, and succinct-form game specifications was coupled with definitions of pure, mixed, 
and behavioural strategies.   
 Several solution concepts and major theorems were also reviewed.  These were 
limited to the Nash Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Kuhn's Theorem, as well 
as the minimax theorem.  A methodology for approximating general game types through a 
conservative transformation to a two player game was also provided.  Emphasis was placed 
on Von Neumann rational behaviour and utility.  For the perturbed game, the extensive-
form trembling-hand equilibrium was defined.  The importance of robustness, stability, and 
adaptability concepts were also discussed.   
 Finally, the chapter concluded with a scenario formulated as a succinct integrity 
game.  In this more appropriate game description, an asset manager seeks to optimize the 
integrity score of a (generalized) asset.  Several modelling parameters were introduced, and 
a qualitative analysis of the limit cases was provided.  This chapter abridges much of the 
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theoretical foundations for the remaining work, which concentrates almost exclusively on 
implementation details and practical applications. 
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4 ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
  
Generalized asset governance can be developed into working architectures for 
autonomous planning.  Successful implementations should prescribe a sequence of actions 
which optimize the utility generated by the asset.  For generalized assets, domain-oblivious 
reward concepts advocate the need for payoff structures evaluated from graph fitness 
indicators and information similarity metrics.  This is a situation of dynamic performance 
optimization, which can be reformulated as a ~2PZSG* type game known as a succinct 
integrity game. 
 This chapter compiles the results from previous chapters into a Generalized Asset 
Integrity Game Engine (GAIGE).  At its core, the GAIGE executes a modified minimax 
search algorithm which exploits a generic problem structure.  Arguments from 
combinatorial symmetry, dynamic programming, sequential optimality, and backwards 
induction are used to establish a model transposition equivalence which returns minimax 
trajectories in linear time, 𝑂(𝑁).  This result constitutes an online, reactive planner which 
can be augmented in 𝑂(√𝑇) time through the use of nearline methods such as test drivers, 
sampling, and bandit algorithms.  The combination of online and nearline algorithms 
deliver a hybrid (heterogeneous), anytime evaluation procedure.  The GAIGE is shown to 
be capable of prescribing epsilon-approximate trembling-hand-perfect strategies.  A 
discussion on how to solve perturbed integrity games using the GAIGE is also presented.   
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 The GAIGE targets several objectives and requirements at both the architectural 
and algorithmic levels. The remainder of this chapter addresses the development, operation 
and performance of a GAIGE implementation.  Prototypical use-cases are also tested and 
benchmarked. 
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4.1 Objectives and Requirements 
 Autonomous planning can be engineered to meet design goals, objectives, 
requirements, specifications, and constraints.  These stipulations manifest themselves at 
multiple scales.  A separation of concerns establishes two primary layers of abstraction, (i.) 
the architecture, and (ii.) the algorithmic implementation.  The former specifies the overall 
framework and organization of the process, while the later details a particular realization 
or construction. 
 The literature on artificial intelligence, search, and planning systems provides a 
basis for the development of guidelines and expectations.  However, the vast majority of 
technological engagements draw from the theme of (optimal) policy and stochastic control 
[Kaelbling et al., 1998].  At the time of this writing, the notions of generalized assets, their 
(integrity) governance, and general game playing agents are still emerging [Genesereth et 
al., 2005], [Kiekintveld 2008], [Finnsson and Bjornsson, 2010].  Unfortunately, adoption 
levels within the physical and industrial asset integrity communities have so far remained 
low.  Nonetheless, many of these emerging research areas have active annual workshops 
and related journals.  For example, the General Intelligence in Game-Playing Agents 
(GIGA) proceedings, or the Ontology Modeling in Physical Asset Integrity Management 
publications of [Ebrahimipour and Yacout, 2015].  This section anticipates their eventual 
usage in the field of (physical or industrial) asset integrity management, and elucidates a 
set of desirable characteristics.  The proposed requirements emphasize solutions which 
offer the greatest range of application for the lowest overall complexity.  
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4.1.1 Architectural Requirements 
 Performing autonomous planning typically mandates high-performance 
architecture. The minimum capabilities vary according to the objectives.  With respect to 
generalized asset integrity games, the primary objectives are to prescribe strategies and 
support efficient gameplay. Architecturally, this requires at least some degree of 
modularity, along with the integration of numerous components (c.f. massively modular 
and parallel distributed processor architectures, which are both instances of reasoning over 
graphs). For succinct integrity games, it is enough to require a three-phase architecture 
consisting of monitoring, evaluation, and prescription stages. 
 In keeping with the impetus of this thesis, we tread through several architectural 
requirements and summarize their practical benefits. Table 4.1 presents a simple three-
phase planning architecture. Table 4.2 offers a high-level summary of the semantic and 
non-functional requirements for such architecture. 
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Table 4.1.  A three-phase architecture with sub-components for autonomous planning 
Phase Modular Components, Tasks and Responsibilities Stage 
 
 
 
Monitoring 
Sensory Activation and Acquisition. 1 
Signal Pre-processing, filtering, conditioning. 2 
Production of raw input stream. 3 
 
 
 
Evaluation 
Generate Live/Active Asset Configuration 4 
Query Reference Configurations 5 
Evaluate Integrity Scores 6 
Perform Minimax Transposition Search 7 
Produce Minimax Tableau 8 
Yield trajectories/strategies 9 
 
 
Prescription 
Query offline knowledge oracle (deliberation base) 10 
Estimate Deviation Risks and Stability Beliefs 11 
Formulate and Select Actions 12 
Output Prescription Results to Effectors/Actuators 13 
Repeat Return/Retrieve Monitoring Data 14 → 1 
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Table 4.2.  Semantic and Non-Functional Architectural Requirements 
 
Requirement 
 
Type 
 
Description 
 
Benefits 
 
Domain-
Oblivious 
 
Semantic 
Does not discriminate based on 
asset class, prior knowledge, or 
information context. 
Remains valid across multiple 
scopes and domains. 
 
 
Platform-
Agnostic 
 
Semantic 
Does not depend on any specific 
computational setting or 
hardware environment. 
Improves ease of deployment. 
Portable across machinery types. 
 
 
 
Model-Driven 
 
 
 
Semantic 
 
Driven by direct model contact, 
embedded descriptions, and 
structural configurations. 
Reduces dependence on big data 
aggregations. 
Avoids data-centric processes 
and large throughput operations. 
Simplifies analytics, reduces 
overhead and latency. 
 
Non-Brittle 
 
Non-
Functional 
Does not require retrofitting 
across projects.  Minimal 
parametric tuning. 
Reduces engineering rework and 
redevelopment. 
 
Graceful 
Degradation 
 
Non-
Functional 
Retains limited functionality, 
self-stabilizes, and is fault-
tolerant. 
Reduces external dependencies. 
Avoids or contains catastrophic 
failures. 
 
 
 
Scalable 
 
 
 
Non-
Functional 
Acceptable scaling laws.  
Latency, throughput, and 
robustness capabilities will not 
scale disproportionately with 
additional resources. 
Reduces the risks of scope drift. 
Predictable long-run 
management and life-cycle 
costs. 
Expands/contracts to suit future 
needs. 
 
 
Accessible 
 
 
Non-
Functional 
Interoperable and versatile use 
cases.   
Supports diverse user types and 
experience levels. 
Accommodates and empowers a 
range of potential users.  Lowers 
the barrier to entry.  Hastens 
learning curve. 
 
Transparent 
 
Non-
Functional 
Open to study, diagnose, test, 
modify, and customize. 
Accommodates variable skill 
levels, reverse engineering, and 
more advanced usage. 
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 Additionally, several functional requirements are prevalent for each of the major 
architectural components.  Assuming a three-phase approach to planning, these 
components can be monitoring, evaluation or prescription based.  Each architectural 
component is subject to several well-defined, technical capabilities.  The demands placed 
on automated planning architectures vary greatly [Ghallab et al., 2004].  We follow a set of 
functional demands from a predominantly non-parametric, non-Bayesian paradigm. We 
term this approach hypermodern.  The hypermodern requirements somewhat juxtapose the 
more classical demands found in the probabilistic setting, from which are associated the 
Markovian and Bayesian decision agents. 
 The inherent prevalence of Bayesian approaches (with respect to multi-agent 
decision making) have led to the consideration of cognitive, behavioural, and non-Bayesian 
revision or rule-update schemes.  In these non-Bayesian settings, agents may use simple 
rules such as linear or convex combinations of information.  Results derived directly from 
Bayesian and other probabilistic approaches are considered robust when the number of 
possible outcomes is finite, and the number of marginals of the data-generating 
distribution(s) are unknown [Owhadi et al., 2015a].  However, Bayesian approaches are 
also known to be generically brittle.   In particular, any given prior and model can be 
slightly perturbed to achieve any desired posterior conclusions [Owhadi et al., 2015b].  The 
mechanisms causing shattering, brittleness and robustness suggest that Bayesian learning 
and robustness are antagonistic requirements, with a missing definitive notion of stability 
[Owhadi et al., 2013].   
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These issues raise concerns about the general applicability of Bayesian inference in 
a continuous world under finite transformations of an information structure.  A close 
inspection of many practical probabilistic decision agents (who implement the theorems of 
Bayes and Cox), suggests that these are in fact held together by non-Bayesian feedback 
loops.  These non-Bayesian feedback loops are typically associated with a performance 
evaluation of what is essentially Bayesian Inference.  In lieu of these interpretations, we 
avoid further complications by seeking non-Bayesian architectures.  One such alternative 
is the aforementioned hypermodern approach. 
 A concise overview of a hypermodern decision agent is that it is predominantly 
non-parametric.  In the probabilistic setting, the higher an agent's expectation of utility from 
an action, the higher the probability of choosing that action [Cao 2007].  Probabilistic 
agents typically form parametric beliefs about the world through progressive information 
gains.  These agents presuppose a coherent set of rules for the asset-environment behaviour.  
In the hypermodern setting, this preference structure either does not hold, or is not required.  
Emphasis is therefore placed on more ad hoc measurements, high-frequency updates, 
unordered beliefs, and action-selection rules which in general cannot be composed into 
“smooth” probability distributions.  The hypermodern agent scales well with access to high-
frequency, low-latency (HFLL) monitoring and control.  This is in contrast with the typical 
probabilistic agent, which tends to prefer low-frequency, high-throughput (LFHT) 
transactions.  Hypermodern agents also perform better in the face of context-switching 
environments [Cao 2007]. 
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 Table 4.3 establishes the functional requirements for a typical monitoring 
component within a three-phase planning architecture.  For our purposes, this monitoring 
is required to be pre-conditioned.  We also require a real-time or near-real-time reporting 
protocol, but do not impose a particular timing constraint, deadline, or penalty scheme.  The 
monitoring component must also support interactive online input streams from multiple 
sources.  The combination of these functional requirements, as well as the overall semantic 
and non-functional requirements of Table 4.2, lend themselves to a high-frequency low-
latency (HFLL) approach. 
 Table 4.4 proposes several requirements for the evaluation modules or components.  
For hypermodern decision agents, the predominant stipulation is that an evaluation of 
monitoring inputs possesses the anytime property.  An evaluation component is said to be 
anytime scalable if it is guaranteed to improve its solution quality (i.e. monotonic-
increasing in expectation) with additional (temporal) resources.  This entails the use so-
called anytime algorithms, which are reviewed in Section 4.1.3.6.  Architecturally, the 
evaluation component is tasked with offering a trade-off between solution quality and 
computational resources. Algorithmically, this can be accomplished in several ways, 
including roll-out style algorithms, or sampling-based improvement techniques [Silver and 
Veness, 2010], [Kocsis and Szepesvari, 2013].  Our choice of implementation is in line 
with meeting the set of hypermodern demands, which prefer to avoid sampling and 
parametrization during runtime.  The proposed evaluation component hybridizes both 
online and nearline evaluations to remain stable and robust.  Other methods for delivering 
anytime guarantees may come at the cost of being numerically unstable or weakly 
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approximate [Browne et al., 2012].  In a hybrid setup, the online evaluation returns secure 
results to the prescription component for the time-critical deployment of strategies.  
Meanwhile, an ongoing nearline (or offline) evaluation can be queried for less time/safety-
critical and more opportunistic results.  This combination of online and nearline (or offline) 
analytics augments the action-selection process by offloading a minimal amount of work 
to the prescription phase. 
 Table 4.5 outlines the functional requirements of a hypermodern prescription phase.  
The prescription component collects the outputs from the evaluation and produces a 
shortlist of the best available strategies along with the chosen alternative(s).  Potential 
trajectories are generated and may be recorded so as to inform and improve the offline 
evaluation component.  The prescription component is primarily responsible for accepting 
the evaluation results and implementing the corresponding control actions.  The currently 
prescribed action-plans, as well as summary data, may be presented through an external 
interface.  This requirement supports a human-in-the-loop (e.g. expert user) or meta-level 
AI.  The presentation of strategies and prescribed actions affords cognitive-level pattern 
recognition, process supervention, quality auditing, and governance oversight if necessary.  
This may be accomplished by way of visual displays, data visualizations, info-metrics, or 
standardized reports.  The architectural requirements emphasize that prescription occurs in 
near-real-time when external interrupts are not present. 
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Table 4.3.  Functional requirements for a hypermodern monitoring component within 
three-phase planning (action-selection) architecture. 
Monitoring 
Requirement 
Functional 
Description 
Technical 
Considerations 
 
 
 
 
Conditioned 
Inputs 
Accept a pre-processed, pre-filtered 
input stream from sensory data or 
model description feeds. 
 
Example: Clean and convert input 
signals.  Only inputs expressed as 
strings of positive-semi definite 
integers on the interval [0, 1010] will 
be accepted. 
Offers a separation of architectural concerns; 
upstream filtering vs. downstream processing, 
etc. 
Complex planning and decision making 
processes are isolated from the nuances of data 
gathering and synthesis. 
Input stream need not be noise-free but should 
be reasonably well-defined and bounded in 
some acceptable language/type. 
 
 
 
Real-Time 
Reporting 
Inputs must be delivered at a rate 
considered to be real-time or near-
real-time; with hard or soft 
deadlines/penalties for violation of 
these timing and reporting 
requirements. 
Example:  Sensory information is 
queried/polled, cleaned, and made 
available as input data every second 
while the asset is active. 
Supports live/active asset monitoring. 
Improves change-detection-rate. 
Quality of service decays with respect to 
deadline exceedance. 
Can create “information overload” scenarios.  
Does not necessarily increase the resolution of 
actionable knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
Online 
Pass-through 
 
As monitoring data is streamed in, it 
must be immediately passed through 
to the evaluation module to be 
operated on in an online (or nearline) 
manner. 
Example:  Inputs are revealed and 
processed sequentially without 
pooling them for batch processing. 
Captures dynamic activity and anomalous 
events near the source. 
Relays this information to the evaluation 
module with minimal overhead. 
Allows operations to be conducted in an 
online, nearline, or streamline manner. 
Avoids an offline analysis which requires an 
aggregate, batch, or larger queue/store for 
datasets. 
 
 
Interactive 
Asset-
Environment 
Monitoring must support interactive 
inputs. 
Example:  An input sequence is 
periodically injected with data owing 
to some potentially interactive 
transactions, or commands as a 
result of some output process. 
 
Allows for slipstream activity. Captures out-
of-order causality. 
An interactive input stream may be related to 
any number of previous input streams, as well 
as to the relationship between them. 
Interactive sequences are difficult to predict 
and often require speculation-free monitoring, 
evaluation, and prescription. 
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Table 4.4.  Functional requirements consistent with a hypermodern evaluation 
component within a three-phase planning (action-selection) architecture. 
Evaluation 
Requirement 
Functional Description Technical 
Considerations 
 
Anytime Performance 
Scaling 
 
 
 
 
 
The evaluation 
component can be 
queried at anytime, 
returning the best-
known solutions or 
results. 
 
Evaluation module(s) progressively enhance 
solutions.  Algorithms do not require specifying 
the resources for completion (non-contract). 
 
RTO Analysis Performs evaluation in a 
real-time online sense. 
Produces a real-time online (RTO) analysis, and 
supplies the prescription component with 
immediately available online-calibre results.  
These results are reactive but safe/secure. 
DD Analysis Augments RTO 
evaluations through a 
deep nearline or offline 
deliberation.   
Conducts a deep-deliberation (DD), in a nearline 
or offline sense, and supplies the prescription 
component with delayed results.  These results are 
more adaptive, predictive and opportunistic. 
 
Competitive 
Evaluations 
 
 
The ratio of online to 
offline analysis 
(competitive ratio) is 
bounded. 
 
The evaluation procedure does not “know” the 
entire set of inputs (including future inputs), but 
can nonetheless implement an effective evaluation. 
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Table 4.5.  Functional requirements for a hypermodern prescription component 
within a three-phase planning (action-selection) architecture. 
Prescription 
Requirement 
Functional Description Technical 
Considerations 
 
Strategy Profiling and 
Decision Ranking 
 
 
Takes as input the 
results/solutions from 
the evaluation 
components and 
compiles a set of 
strategies (and strategy 
profiles). 
Yields a set of top-ranked candidate state-transition 
trajectories. 
 
Isolates the pre-requisite resources and action 
sequences to achieve optimal asset 
behaviour/operation. 
 
Plan Generation and 
Action-Selection 
Formulates an optimal* 
plan.  Prescribes the 
sequence of actions 
leading to desired 
goals/state(s). 
Selects the most appropriate state-transition 
trajectory. 
* = optimal w.r.t criteria/definitions. 
Outputs the single best-response move/actions as 
well as the expected trajectory for the asset. 
Control and 
Effectuation 
Sends a control signal or 
policy revision protocol 
to actuators and/or 
affectors. 
Cyber-physically implements a realization of the 
move, action, or desired state-transition. 
 
Ongoing/Active 
Reporting 
 
Produces as output a 
summary of the active 
decision-making 
process. 
Outputs should display an active summary of 
relevant information in a human-interpretable 
form.  E.g. Summary Reports, Tabular, Charts, 
Visual displays, etc. 
 
I/O Interfacing 
 
 
Provides users with 
access to input/output 
options and 
configurable parameters 
(if applicable). 
Allows expert supervision, advanced tuning, 
auditing and diagnostics. 
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4.1.2 Algorithmic Requirements 
 The implementation of an architecture for generalized asset integrity planning 
necessitates the use of computational resources.  In a three-phase architecture, each 
component may require the deployment of its own computational procedures.  The 
suitability of an algorithm will vary by task; whether it is for monitoring and pre-
conditioning the input streams, evaluating strategies and solving succinct integrity games, 
selecting and implementing control actions, or visually presenting the results to the user.  
Each of the monitoring, evaluation, and prescription components can be computationally 
intensive, challenging to implement and sensitive to design choices [Sleight and Durfee, 
2013].   
 In keeping with the impetus, we narrow our discussion to the key evaluation 
components within a three-phase planning architecture.  The conditioning of 
inputs/outputs, pre/post processing, and dataflow to/from the non-evaluation components 
are considered negligible.  These are relatively straightforward tasks representing the 
interface between the evaluation component(s) and the monitoring or prescription phases. 
For our purposes, we define an evaluation component to consist of three (3) major 
algorithmic tasks: 
 1.) Estimate the state-transition costs. 
 2.) Directly solve the base game. 
 3.) Attempt to improve solutions to the perturbed integrity game. 
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These tasks are listed by order of precedence.  They are ongoing in the sense that they must 
be performed at each iteration or when signaled that a change in the asset is detected.   
In (1), we seek algorithms which evaluate the integrity score of the asset relative to 
a pre-computed set of reference configurations (integrity states).  For each integrity state or 
idealized reference configuration, a complex function may need to be evaluated.  This 
function scores the fitness-level of the asset based on model dependability metrics and uses 
the normalized compression distance to ascertain the relative similarity to each of the states.  
Repeating this process for each integrity state will populate an array which expresses the 
estimated integrity score for each potential state-transition.  This array contains the integrity 
scores or state-transition costs, and constitutes the payoff structure for the base game. 
 In (2), we seek algorithms which are calibrated towards efficiently solving a class 
of succinct integrity games.  Hypermodern decision agents demand high-frequency, low-
latency information updates.  As such, this portion of the “game solver” should be 
compatible with real-time online constraints.  Algorithms which directly solve the base 
game are required to be deterministic.  They must report the principal variation as a pure 
or mixed strategy Nash Equilibria up to some fixed evaluation depth.  For a two-player 
succinct integrity game, this process corresponds to returning the set of all minimax state-
transition trajectories. 
 In (3), we invoke the anytime requirements, and seek algorithms which iteratively 
improve solutions to the perturbed integrity game. No additional algorithmic requirements 
are imposed, although it would seem that a deep, nearline or offline search of the state space 
is the most appropriate.  In the deliberation setting, it becomes more feasible to attempt a 
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proper learning of the generator functions for the stochastic noise and other perturbative 
effects.  Table 4.6 postulates a set of desirable characteristics and acceptable computational 
specifications.  Taken together, these circumstances influence the choice of deployed 
algorithms. 
 
Table 4.6. Algorithmic Modules for Integrity Game Solvers under Hypermodern 
Evaluation Demands. 
Algorithmic 
Configuration 
Working 
Description 
Functional 
Requirements 
Complexity 
Requirements 
Integrity Score Evaluation of a cost 
function. 
Estimates the integrity 
scores between state-
transitions. 
Yields a payoff matrix (input 
array) within 𝑂(𝑁 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁) using 
standard compression (NCD) 
techniques. 
Online 
Evaluation 
RTO solver for 
Baseline Integrity 
Games. 
Computes all minimax 
trajectories. 
Solves the base integrity game 
(2PZSG) in 𝑂(𝑁) time. 
Nearline 
or 
Offline 
Evaluation 
DDO solver for the 
Perturbed Integrity 
Games. 
Computes long-run 
stable strategies and/or 
learns complex noise 
generating functions. 
Yields an epsilon-approximate 
globally optimal principal 
variation in up to 𝑂(𝑁2)time, 
with 𝑂(𝑁 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁) being ideal. 
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4.1.3 Supplemental Notions 
4.1.3.1 Automated Planning 
 Automated planning is a branch of artificial intelligence which conducts the 
algorithmic search for strategies and actions.  The solutions to automated planning 
problems are often more complex than classical control and classification problems.  This 
is due to the multi-dimensional and highly dynamic problem structure.  Planning problems 
contend with multiple intelligent agents, each interacting competitively or cooperatively, 
reporting fuzzy beliefs, non-transitive preferences, and chaotic knowledge about the 
environment.  The automated search for plans, strategies, or action sequences is performed 
through algorithms which explore the state and/or configuration space of the system.  This 
is accomplished through either a direct traversal towards a goal, and/or indirect sampling 
to synthesize admissible and thereafter optimal solutions. 
4.1.3.2 Real-Time Online Algorithms 
 Real-Time Online (RTO) algorithms are subject to both real-time and online 
requirements.  Real-time conditions must guarantee a response within strict time 
constraints, often referred to as deadlines.  For “hard” real-time constraints, violation of 
deadlines leads to system failure.  For “soft” real-time constraints, violations are tolerated 
as progressively-critical faults which degrade the quality of service but may nonetheless 
allow for recovery.  For complex asset governance, deadline requirements may vary.  
Acceptable response times are typically in the order of several seconds.  In this context, 
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real-time planning algorithms will at any given time receive data, process them, and output 
results so as to affect the asset at near this time.  Online algorithms are restricted to a piece-
wise, subset handling of inputs.  This often implies a sequential realization of the problem.  
An online algorithm receives a sequence of requests and performs an immediate action in 
response to each request in kind.  Since they do not know all the given information at once, 
online algorithms are forced to make decisions that may turn out to be sub-optimal or even 
detrimental.  The study of real-time online (RTO) algorithms has focused on the quality of 
decision making that is possible under both real-time and online conditions.  In this setting, 
RTO planning is designed to work fast and abruptly, performing decision making after each 
input request, and producing well-formed responses within seconds. 
4.1.3.3 Offline Algorithms 
 Offline algorithms are given access to the entire range of inputs in advance.  An 
offline algorithm formulates a plan which by itself still represents taking an action in 
response to each request sequentially.  Unlike online algorithms, the choice of each action 
can be based on the entire sequence of requests.  An offline algorithm essentially knows 
the future and implements a zero-regret policy trajectory, navigating the state-space 
optimally. 
4.1.3.4 Performability of Online and Offline Algorithms 
 The most common approach to assessing the performability of RTO planning is to 
assume a specific stochastic model of the source of inputs, requests, event arrivals, state 
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realizations, etc.  Within such a model, an online algorithm may be considered optimal if it 
chooses its actions so as to minimize some cost functional.  Here, the cost depends on the 
sequence of requests generated by the stochastic source, and on the sequence of actions 
chosen by the online algorithm in response to those requests.  The choice of stochastic 
model hinges on data being readily available about the observed sequence history, and also 
requires faith that the future will resemble the past [Zilberstein, 1996].  For these reasons, 
stochastic input models may be rather limited for some forms of asset integrity planning.  
Rather inappropriately, much of the theory of stochastic control, risk-based scheduling, and 
performance analysis is based on this approach [Borodin and El-Yaniv, 2005].  One 
alternative to stochastic models is a worst-case approach inspired by minimax regret and 
stochastic game theory.  Here, the optimality of an online algorithm is evaluated by 
contrasting its cost with that of an optimal offline algorithm processing the same sequence 
of requests.  In literature, this is known as the competitive ratio. 
4.1.3.5 The Competitive Ratio 
 The competitive ratio is defined as the maximum, over all possible input sequences, 
of the ratio between the cost incurred by the online algorithm and the cost incurred by the 
optimal offline algorithm [Borodin and El-Yaniv, 2005].  In this model, an optimal online 
algorithm is one whose competitive ratio is a minimum.  The main virtue of the competitive 
ratio approach is that it avoids commitment to a particular stochastic input model.  
However, the approach is pessimistic and essentially assumes the request sequence is 
chosen by an all-knowing (offline) adversary.  In practice, one seeks RTO algorithms which 
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perform well on typical request sequences while maintaining a small competitive ratio.  
This balance can often be achieved through anytime algorithms, which hybridize both the 
online and offline settings. 
4.1.3.6 Anytime Algorithms 
 Anytime algorithms constitute a class of search techniques which provide 
automated planning suitable for stochastic learning and the performance optimization of 
complex assets.  These algorithms hybridize aspects of real-time online fast-response with 
offline deep-calculation and future-proof deliberation.  An anytime algorithm can return a 
valid, admissible solution to a problem even if it is interrupted prematurely.  Anytime 
planning algorithms find and report incrementally better solutions as additional 
computational resources are provided.  In general, one assumes monotonically increasing 
results [Zilberstein, 1996].  As the time to perform the algorithmic search increases, the 
quality of the plan is expected to approach optimality.  This is in contrast to contract 
algorithms, which take as input some fixed amount of computation, run to completion, and 
provide a single best answer.  Contract algorithms guarantee a correct output only after 
proper termination, with no guarantees on intermediate results.  When interrupted before 
finding a global optimum, anytime algorithms will return partial, best-known approximate 
solutions. Anytime algorithms therefore scale with any allocation of computational 
resource. 
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4.1.3.7 Anytime Performance 
 Anytime performance is typically evaluated through the use of competitive ratios 
and performance profiles [Borodin and El-Yaniv, 2005].  A performance profile estimates 
the quality of results based on the input and the amount of time that is allotted to the 
algorithm.  It is a mapping of time to the quality of expected results.  The probability of a 
result being correct (certainty), the error bounds (accuracy), and the amount of 
discrimination between other results (specificity), each contribute to the quality.  The 
competitive ratio, which measures the degree to which an online algorithm approaches the 
performance of an offline algorithm, is also used.  When both these techniques are 
combined, the performance of an anytime algorithm can be monitored and potentially 
controlled by solving some meta-level computational resource allocation problem.  For 
additional details on managing the stopping times of multiple anytime algorithms, see for 
example the works of [Zilberstein, 1996], and [Borodin and El-Yaniv, 2005]. 
4.1.3.8 Desirable Anytime Characteristics 
 In terms of asset integrity, the techniques for automated planning, performance 
optimization, and algorithmic search are inter-related.  Anytime conditions have been 
applied to several families of algorithms [Thayer and Wheeler, 2010].  These include: 
numerical optimization (e.g. gradient descent, hill-climbing), heuristic search (e.g. tabu 
search, particle swarm), nondeterministic algorithms (e.g. Monte Carlo and genetic 
perturbation methods), probabilistic inference (e.g. Deep Belief Networks inspired from 
Bayes, Markov, Boltzmann, ANN), combinatorial search (graph coloring), and discrete 
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symbolic processing (string matching).  Applying anytime constraints may alter the 
algorithmic implementation of the numerical method, particularly if it is inherently 
sequential, embarrassingly parallel, or fundamentally offline.  This can potentially lead to 
program code which is more ad-hoc, difficult to deploy, and/or harder to maintain. 
 Irrespective of the implementation, there exist several characteristics which are 
considered desirable, if not required, for a legitimate anytime planning algorithm 
[Zilberstein, 1996].  A summary of these characteristics includes: 
1. Interruptible:  The algorithm can be stopped at any-time and provide some answer. 
2. Pre-emptive:  The algorithm can be suspended and resumed with minimal overhead. 
3. Monotonic:  The quality of the best-known and returnable result is a non-decreasing 
function of the computation time. 
4. Measurable quality:  The quality of an approximate result can be determined 
approximately, often at runtime. 
5. Nondeterministic Consistency:  For a given input, the quality of the result with respect 
to computation time is approximately the same each time. 
6. Diminishing Returns:  The improvement in solution quality is the largest at the early 
stages of computation, and the improvement diminishes over time. 
7. Completeness:  Given infinite resources, for any inputs, the globally optimal solutions 
should be found, or reported that they do not exist. 
In addition, requirements usually specify a strong competitive ratio, hard or soft real-
time constraints, tailored performance profiles, and bounds on the overall computational 
complexity. 
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4.2 The Game Engine 
 The Generalized Asset Integrity Game Engine (GAIGE) is a game-playing agent 
for the rapid generation of decision sequences.  In its prototypical form, it aims to 
implement a basic anytime search over the state-space of possible move orderings, 
returning the most promising strategies and formulating integrity plans guided by game-
theoretic optimality criteria (i.e. equilibrium corridors). 
 
4.2.1 Scope 
 The GAIGE uses the architectural and algorithmic guidelines of Section 4.1 for 
autonomous planning and governance.  These are conservative by design, emphasizing 
several of the robustness and stability concepts of Chapter 3.  High performance decision-
making is sought in the face of adversarial dynamics, hostile environments, and anytime 
preemptive feedback.  This entails a time-sequential, dynamic optimization of a complex 
evaluation function (the integrity score) based on the principles of Chapter 2.  Hyper-
modern demands are imposed, signifying a requirement that solutions avoid over-fitting 
and scale well (low-latency, high-throughput) across domain types, sizes, and uncertainty 
regimes. 
 These requirements emphasize numerical solutions which are “easy to implement”, 
and in general, tolerant of forced modelling errors (i.e. when strong uncertainty reduction 
is infeasible).  This leads to the anticipation of low complexity anytime algorithms with 
(competitive) asymptotic performance guarantees.  The prototypical GAIGE utilizes an 
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anytime search procedure for plan generation.  This yields a prescription of reactive 
strategies which secure the immediate survival of the asset (in a deterministic and myopic 
sense).  Given additional resources, the GAIGE explores strategies which are increasingly 
adapted to the perturbations. 
 
4.2.2 Minimax Transposition Search (MTS) 
 In their basic form, minimax algorithms return principal variations and constitute 
a type of adversarial search procedure.  For many games, (principal) variations can be 
thought of as (the best and/or most likely) lines of play.  Principal variations represent the 
expected path(s) of traversal, such as move-orderings for decision-trees or vertex-cycles in 
graphs. 
 Seeking principal variations rapidly and robustly is crucial if one is trying to 
elaborate plans within adversarial environments.  The search routines for many high-
performance game engines typically involve some form of minimax search (e.g. Chess and 
Go).  Minimax is typically employed in 2-player finite discrete sequential games (i.e. 
combinatorial games).  Variants of the basic minimax process have been developed to 
exploit problem-specific features, taking advantage of special structure and providing 
accelerated results.  Standard enhancements include alpha-beta pruning (e.g. negascout), 
moving-window searches with test-drivers (e.g. MTD-f), iterative deepening and 
quiescence (i.e. intelligent fan-out), as well as number-theoretic exploits (e.g. magic and 
conspiracy numbers), [ChessProgramming.com Wiki pages, 2015].  In more complex 
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games, search procedures may include contributions from fictitious and/or randomized 
play, pattern matching, opening books, advanced rulesets, and endgame databases. 
 The primary goal of minimax enhancements is to reduce the amount of 
computational effort required to return principal variations.  Several of the aforementioned 
approaches can reduce the worst-case running time of 𝑂(𝑘𝑡), where k is the average 
branching factor, and t is the search depth.  In the GAIGE, the principal variations are 
equivalent to the minimax trajectories through the game dynamical system.  These paths 
also represent elements of a set of “stable” oscillations for an ergodic family of systems 
under 2PZSG dynamics.  Therefore, enumerating the elements of such a set is equivalent 
to returning all the minimax principal variations. 
 Minimax Transposition Search (MTS) is the search procedure used to solve the 
repeated base game component of the GAIGE.  MTS is a search procedure which proceeds 
via backward induction from a finite stopping horizon (fixed search depth).  It is inspired 
by dynamic programming and the principal of optimality first proposed by Bellman (c.f. 
optimal substructure, [Bellman, 1957]).  The MTS algorithm acknowledges the inherent 
symmetry and substructure present in the succinct-form base integrity game.  This 
manifests itself in several ways.  First, since all k actions are potentially available to either 
player at any time-step, the search admits a constant branching factor.  This branching is 
bounded by some fixed branching rate k, supporting a simplified decomposition and 
traversal.  Second, we note that every state-transition reward/cost is fixed throughout all 
time-steps.  Informally, this leads to a realization that after a finite number of state-
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transitions, one will be revisiting a particular reward state (as the same player to move and 
minimax).  This repetition of previously visited states through different permutations of a 
move ordering is known as a transposition.  The MTS algorithm works by exploiting the 
symmetry and invariance of information, actions, payoffs, and state-transitions.  By making 
use of a special substructure whereby “everything is eventually a transposition”, the MTS 
is able to return all principal variations in both linear time and space. 
 Figure 4.1 presents the MTS algorithm in its entirety, with comments and 
pseudocode adapted from a prototypical GAIGE implemented in the Python (version 2.79) 
programming language.  The program code was developed solely by the author as part of 
the thesis work, with references to the work of Bubek et Al. for the Bandit algorithms 
component. 
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Figure 4.1. The Minimax Transposition Search (MTS) algorithm as implemented in 
the GAIGE. 
Algorithm MTS (page 1). 
1 Initialization with inputs N, T. 
 
aPayoffs ← {𝑎11,𝑎12,. . . , 𝑎𝑖𝑗}; 
aCS ← {0}𝑁;  aMinCS ← {0}𝑁;  aMaxCS ← {0}𝑁; 
Initialize the set of 𝑁2 
actions (state transition 
payoffs).  Also initialize 
arrays for cumulative sums, 
and their min and max. 
2 for  t = 0, ..., T  do For each of the T rounds. 
3    x ← 0;   
   aMulti ← 0;   
   aLineOut ← {“Depth %s Min – Path [“ % (t+1)}; 
 
Initialize location index, 
transposition count, and 
set line outputs for the min 
player. 
4    for  j = 0, ..., N  do For each of the N sources 
(jth row). 
5       aMinX ← -1;  aMin ← ∞; Initialize location/bounds. 
6          for  i = 0, ..., N  do For each of the N 
destinations (ith col). 
7             if  aMin >= aCS[i] + aPayoffs[x]:            Check for a new minimum. 
8                if  aMin == aCS[i] + aPayoffs[x]: 
                     aMulti ← aMulti + 1; 
 
Check for multiple paths 
leading to same cumulative 
payoffs (transpositions). 
9                else 
                  aMulti ← 1;   
                  aMin ← aCS[i] + aPayoffs[x]; 
                  aMinX ← {i}; 
Update the location of the 
minimum cumulative sum 
and its value. 
10             x ← x + 1; 
          
Increment the location 
index. 
11          end for Exit the i loop. 
12          aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“%s” % aMinX}; 
         if aMulti > 1:  aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“*%s” % aMulti}; 
         aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“,  “}; 
Format and store the line 
outputs. 
13          aMinCS[j]  ←  aMin; Update the minimum 
cumulative sum. 
14    end for  Exit the j loop. 
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Algorithm MTS (page 2). 
15    aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“] Sum of Payoffs [”}; 
   for  q = 0, ..., size(aMinCS)  do 
      aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“%s, ” % aMinCS[q]}; 
   end for 
Format the line outputs to 
show the accumulated 
payoffs up to the current 
depth. 
16    output  flush(aLineOut, “print()”) Flush line outputs to the 
screen and/or store in logs. 
17    x ← 0;   
   aMulti ← 0;   
   aLineOut ← {“Depth %s Max – Path [“ % (t+1)}; 
 
Reset location index, 
transposition count, and 
set line outputs for the max 
player. 
18    for  j = 0, ..., N  do For each of the N sources 
(jth row). 
19       aMaxX ← 𝑁;  aMax ← 0; Initialize location/bounds. 
20          for  i = 0,...,N  do For each of the N 
destinations (ith col). 
21             if  aMax <= aMinCS[i] + aPayoffs[x]:            Check for a new maximum. 
22                if  aMax == aMinCS[i] + aPayoffs[x]: 
                     aMulti ← aMulti + 1; 
 
Check for multiple paths 
leading to same cumulative 
payoffs (transpositions). 
23                else 
                  aMulti ← 1;   
                  aMax ← aMinCS[i] + aPayoffs[x]; 
                  aMaxX ← {i}; 
Update the location of the 
maximum cumulative sum 
and its value. 
24              x ← x + 1; 
          
Increment the location 
index. 
25          end for Exit the i loop. 
26          aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“%s” % aMaxX}; 
         if aMulti > 1:  aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“*%s” % aMulti}; 
         aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“,  “}; 
Format and store the line 
outputs. 
27          aCS[j]  ←  aMax; Update the cumulative sum 
with the new maximum. 
28    end for  Exit the j loop. 
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Algorithm MTS (page 3). 
29    aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“] Sum of Payoffs [”}; 
   for  q = 0, ..., size(aCS)  do 
      aLineOut ← aLineOut + {“%s, ” % aCS[q]}; 
   end for 
Format the line outputs to 
show the accumulated 
payoffs up to the current 
depth. 
30    output  flush(aLineOut, “print()”) Flush line outputs to the 
screen and/or store in logs. 
31 end for Exit the main loop. 
32 return  0 End of algorithm MTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
110 
 
4.2.3 Stochastic and Adversarial Optimal (SAO) Bandits 
 Multi-armed bandits (MAB) are well-known in the literature on sequential decision 
analysis and statistical process control.  In the bandit setting, an agent must sequentially 
choose actions so as to maximize the cumulative, expected, or discounted long-run reward.  
Through sequential (possibly noisy) feedback, it becomes possible to build a model of the 
relationship between actions and rewards.  At each time-step, the agent may choose actions 
in order to improve its model (exploration), or select actions believed to yield high rewards 
according to the model (exploitation).  This results in an exploration-exploitation dilemma 
which is hard to solve in general.  The basic MAB problem has been extensively studied in 
[Agrawal and Goyal, 2012] with provisions for safety vs. risk dilemmas studied in [Galichet 
et al., 2013]. 
 Variations on the MAB theme have been cross-pollinated by research into planning 
algorithms and experimental design [Kocsis and Szepesvari, 2013].  The basic MAB 
formulation is similar to an MDP, with extensions showing correspondence to POMDP 
models [Silver and Veness, 2010].  These problems can be solved using dynamic 
programming techniques such as value or policy iteration [Filar and Vrieze, 1997].  
Unfortunately, these techniques typically require algorithms of exponential complexity in 
the number of independent arms.  More recent approaches utilize stochastic reinforcement 
learning (c.f. Q-learning, H-infinite control) with adaptive sampling.  Such methods 
typically recycle the ideas of Thompson (c.f. Thompson Sampling), Gittins (c.f. Gittins 
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Index), or Whittle (c.f. Whittle Index).  The complexity of these approaches typically 
ranges from linear to cubic in the number of actions [Agrawal and Goyal, 2012]. 
 MAB algorithms have also been developed under the probably-approximately-
correct (PAC) learning framework of Valiant [Valiant, 1984].  In the PAC framework, one 
seeks approximate solutions which are optimal in the sense of two-sided error (epsilon, 
delta) bounds on the notion of regret, which is typically a convex loss function.  Fast, 
scalable classes of bandit algorithms utilizing these ideas include the epsilon-greedy, UCB, 
Softmax (Boltzmann), and EXP bandits.  These algorithms work online and deliver fast, 
near-optimal solutions in potentially sub-linear time [Audibert and Bubeck, 2009].  These 
algorithms represent the current state-of-the-art, solving the exploration-exploitation 
dilemma across many problem classes, including several variations of MAB, MDP, and 
POMDP. 
 The GAIGE utilizes an algorithm known as the Stochastic and Adversarial Optimal 
(SAO) bandit.  The SAO was developed for the MAB framework by Bubeck and Slivkins 
[Bubeck and Slivkins, 2012].  This algorithm has been modified and implemented by the 
author as part of a near-line extension of the MTS component of the GAIGE.  The SAO 
works by minimizing the competitive regret, or alternatively maximizing the competitive 
ratio as outlined in Section 4.1.3.  Thus, one typically seeks to compare the online rewards 
received by a MAB algorithm up to some stopping-time with respect to some offline 
benchmark.  A standard offline benchmark is the best-possible action-sequence in hindsight 
[Audibert and Bubeck, 2009].  What makes the SAO algorithm exceptional is that it 
achieves the “best of both worlds” after a reasonable number of rounds, T.   
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In SAO, the worst-case regret is bounded by 𝑂(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇)) when the reward 
environment is stochastic, and 𝑂(√(𝑇)) when it is adversarial.  This represents an attack-
defense balance which gracefully enhances the agnostic behaviour of the MTS.  A complete 
discussion of the SAO is available through the work of Bubeck and Slivkins (2012), 
[Bubeck and Slivkins, 2012].  These authors also provide the relevant theorems and proofs 
of convergence.  We have recruited their ideas and present them in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.  As 
mentioned, the SAO algorithm is anytime scalable and competitive.  It has been revised 
and implemented as part of the near-line component of the GAIGE in order to solve the 
perturbed integrity game. 
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Figure 4.2.  The Multi-Armed-Bandit (MAB) framework with both adversarial and 
stochastic reward feedback. 
 Known parameters:  N actions; T rounds; non-degenerate choice: (𝑇 ≥ 𝑁 ≥ 2). 
 Unknown parameters: 
 (i.) Adversarial setting:  non-parametric → none; 
 (ii.) Stochastic setting:   𝑁  i.i.d. probability distributions  𝑣1,..., 𝑣𝑁  on  [0,1]. 
                       Each  𝑣𝑖  parameterized by mixture of moments, θ𝑖: 
                       e.g. θ𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛μ𝑖, 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒σ𝑖, 𝑒𝑡𝑐. ). 
 For  each  round  𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇; 
   (1) A MAB algorithm chooses an action 𝐴𝑡 ∈ {1,..., 𝑁}  (possibly randomly). 
   (2) The environment selects rewards according to the exposed model: 
      – An adversary simultaneously selects rewards 𝑔𝑡 = (𝑔1,𝑡,..., 𝑔𝑁,𝑡) ∈ [0,1]
𝑁. 
      – Each reward 𝑔𝑡 ∼ 𝑣𝑖 is drawn stochastically and independently. 
   (3) The forecaster observes (and receives) the reward 𝑔𝐴𝑡,𝑡.   
      – In the MAB framework, the forecaster does not observe the rewards from other arms. 
 Goal:  Minimize the regret, defined for each respective environment: 
    – Adversarial model: 
𝑅?̂? = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖∈{1,...,𝑁}
∑𝑔𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
−∑𝑔𝐴𝑡,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
   – Stochastic model: 
𝑅?̃? =∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖∈{1,...,𝑁}
(𝜃𝑖) − 𝜃𝐴
𝑇
𝑡=1
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Figure 4.3.  The Stochastic and Adversarial Optimal (SAO) algorithm of Bubeck and 
Slivkins (2012). 
Algorithm SAO (page 1). 
1 Initialize the SAO Bandit with inputs N, T, 𝜷 > 𝟏. 
S ← {1, …, N}; 
K = N;  
Initialize the set S of active strategy 
profiles (perceived as arms or actions in 
the Bandit framework). 
 2  
for  i = 1, …, K  do  
For each of the K actions (where each 
action denotes an MTS minimax 
strategy to follow). 
3    𝜏𝑖  ← {𝑇};  
   𝑝𝑖,𝑡  ← {1 𝐾⁄ }; 
The time 𝜏𝑖 when action i is 
deactivated, and its probability 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 of 
selection at time t. 
4 end for  End of initialization. 
5 for  t = 1, …, T  do  Begin the main loop. 
6    play  𝐴𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 with 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 Select an active action with the 
appropriate probability. 
7    for  i = 1, …, K  do  For each action, test several properties 
(4 total under SAO). 
8       if  (𝑖 ∈ 𝑆) ∧ (max 
𝑗∈𝑆
?̃?𝑗,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑖,𝑡) > α1(𝑖, 𝑡) Test function 1. 
Deactivation threshold. 
9       then  𝑆 ← 𝑆 \ {𝑖}; τ𝑖  ← 𝑡;  𝑞𝑖 ← 𝑝𝑖,𝑡;   Deactivation:  Remove action I from the 
active set.  Update the deactivation 
time 𝜏𝑖 and probability 𝑞𝑖 at time of 
deactivation. 
10       end if   
11       if  |?̃?𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖,𝑡| > α2(𝑖, 𝑡) Test function 2. 
Consistency condition. 
12       or  (𝑖 ∉ 𝑆) ∧ (max
𝑗∈𝑆
 ?̃?𝑗,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑖,𝑡) > α3(𝑖, 𝑡)   Test function 3. 
Sub-optimality threshold. 
13       or  (𝑖 ∉ 𝑆) ∧ (max
𝑗∈𝑆
?̃?𝑗,𝑡 − ?̃?𝑖,𝑡) > α4(𝑖, 𝑡)   Test function 4. 
Significance threshold. 
14       then  call  algorithm  EXP3.P: 
         𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1  ←  EXP3.P(δ ∈ (0,1)) 
If one of tests 2-4 is true, then the 
environment satisfies the properties of 
being adversarial, and we update with 
EXP3.P. 
15       end if   
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Algorithm SAO (page 2). 
16     
   end for  
End of testing phase 
(exploration).   
Exit the 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 loop. 
17    for  i = 1, …, K  do   
Update the action selection 
probabilities ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆. 18 
𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 ← (
𝑞𝑖τ𝑖
𝑡 + 1
) {1}𝑖∉𝑆 +
1
|𝑆|
(1 −∑
𝑞𝑖τ𝑖
𝑡 + 1
𝑗∉𝑆
){1}𝑖∈𝑆 
19    end for   End of updating phase 
(exploitation). 
Exit the 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 loop. 
20 end for   Exit of main loop. 
21 return 0   End of algorithm SAO. 
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The SAO algorithm of Figure 4.3 makes use of following notation, terminology, 
and statistical test functions: 
 The cumulative reward of a fixed strategy i up to time t, and its average: 
 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑔𝑖,𝑚
𝑚=𝑡
𝑚=1 ,   𝐻𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑡
𝐺𝑖,𝑡 4.1, 4.2 
 The estimated cumulative reward from strategy i up to time t, and its average: 
 ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (𝑔𝑖,𝑚𝐴𝑖,𝑚 / 𝑝𝑖.𝑚)
𝑚=𝑡
𝑚=1 ,   ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑡
?̃?𝑖,𝑡 4.3, 4.4 
 The algorithm's cumulative reward from strategy i up to time t, and its average: 
 ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (𝑔𝑖,𝑚𝐴𝑖,𝑚)
𝑚=𝑡
𝑚=1 ,   ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 / ∑ 𝐴𝑖,𝑚
𝑚=𝑡
𝑚=1  4.4, 4.5 
 
Table 4.7.  Formulae used by the SAO bandit algorithm (ref. Figure 4.3). 
Function Derived Formula 
1 Deactivation threshold 
α1(𝑖, 𝑡) = 6√
4𝐾 log(β)
𝑡
+ 5 (
𝐾 log(β)
𝑡
)
2
 
2 Consistency condition 
with 𝑡𝑖
* = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(τ𝑖, 𝑡) α2(𝑖, 𝑡) = √
2 log(β)
∑ 𝐴𝑖,𝑚
𝑚=𝑡
𝑚=1
+√4(
𝐾𝑡𝑖
*
𝑡2
+
𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖
*
𝑞𝑖τ𝑖𝑡
) log(β) + 5(
𝐾 log(β)
𝑡𝑖
*
)
2
 
3 Differential sub-
optimality at 
deactivation time. 
α3(𝑖, 𝑡) = 10√
4𝐾 log(β)
τ𝑖 − 1
+ 5(
𝐾 log(β)
τ𝑖 − 1
)
2
 
4 Significance of rewards 
at deactivation time. α4(𝑖, 𝑡) = 2√
4𝐾 log(β)
τ𝑖
+ 5(
𝐾 log(β)
τ𝑖
)
2
 
 
 The functions in Table 4.7 represent bounds which provably hold with high 
probability (w.h.p.).  These are implemented as inequalities against some reward, loss, or 
regret criterion.   
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For example, line (11) of Figure 4.3 performs a statistical test, |?̃?𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖,𝑡| >
α2(𝑖, 𝑡), which evaluates to true if a consistency condition for adversarial environments is 
met.  In this case, line (11) implies that for any strategy or action, the absolute difference 
in ?̃?𝑖,𝑡, the average of the cumulative reward estimates, and ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, the average cummulative 
rewards experienced thus far, should not exceed a limit threshold in order to be consistent 
with the random play of a stochastic environment. 
 The lines (11, 12, and 13) in Figure 4.3, and the corresponding bounds α2,α3,α4 of 
Table 4.7, ensure that if any one of the three statistical tests evaluate to true, the disjunction 
will be true, and the SAO algorithm then utilizes the EXP3.P revision protocol to guard 
against adversarial dynamics.  This is in contrast to the UCB/INF-inspired bandit updating 
of lines (17, 18), which are calibrated for stochastic environments. 
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 Ultimately, the SAO component of a prototypical GAIGE implementation will 
compute the strategy selection probabilities using the following schemes: 
 
 If exploration/testing indicates an adversarial payoff structure, utilize a variant of 
EXP3.P-bandits for revision: 
EXP3.P: 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 ⇐ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡+1 ← (1 − 𝛾)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜂?̃?𝑖,𝑡)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜂?̃?𝑘,𝑡)
𝑘=𝐾
𝑘=1
+
𝛾
𝐾
 4.6 
with 𝛽 =
√𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝛿−1)
𝑛𝐾
 𝛾 = 1.05
√𝐾 𝑙𝑛(𝐾)
𝑛
 𝜂 = 0.95
√𝑙𝑛(𝐾)
𝑛𝐾
 
4.7, 4.8, 
4.9 
 
 If exploration/testing indicates a stochastic payoff structure, utilize a variant of 
UCB/INF-bandits for revision: 
UCB/INF: 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 ⇐ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 ← 
𝑞𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑡 + 1
{1}𝑖∉𝑆 +
1
|𝑆|
(1 −∑
𝑞𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑡 + 1
𝑗∉𝑆
){1}𝑖∈𝑆 4.10 
with 
{1}𝐶  denoting an indicator function returning 1 if the clause C is 
true and 0 otherwise. 
4.11 
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 The SAO bandit balances between attacking a weak adversary (stochastic reward 
environment), and defending itself from a more devious adversary that targets the 
algorithm's weaknesses.  This an example of defensive forecasting, which avoids being 
overly aggressive if the reward sequence is seemingly stochastic.  It can nonetheless find 
optimism in the face of uncertainty [Vovk et al, 2008].  The SAO bandit also has the 
advantage of avoiding the Bayesian pathology of greedy conditioning and myopic variance 
reduction [Owhadi et al., 2015].  This makes the algorithm indirectly useful for change-
point detection, as well as being less prone to overfitting, less brittle, and less readily 
shattered (c.f. VC-dimension) than many alternatives in the literature [Owhadi et al., 2013]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
120 
 
4.3 Benchmarks 
Preliminary benchmarks for the GAIGE were conducted using an AMD Phenom II 
6-core processor operating at 4.017 GHz with 8 GB of DDR3 RAM at 1866 MHz.  The 
operating system was a 64-bit Lubuntu with Linux Kernel 4.2 and Python 2.77.  All tests 
with the GAIGE were run with multiprocessing modules enabled.  The test suite consisted 
of a varying a set of inputs randomly at each time-step so as to simulate a sequence 
adaptations to small but ever-present perturbations to the base game.  For each round, the 
array elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 of the base game are perturbed by at most |𝜀| = ± 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝛾𝑎𝑖𝑗) 
according to a uniform normal distribution with parameters 𝜀𝜇 = 0 and 𝜀𝜎 = 1, and fixed 
values 𝛾, 𝑁, 𝑇 by test run.  For each iteration through the GAIGE, the MTS algorithm takes 
𝑂(𝑁) steps to produce pure strategies.  These strategies can be mixed by a nearline bloom 
out of the SAO bandit algorithm, requiring up to an additional T = N steps to achieve regret-
minimization within the bounds 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝑂(𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁) to 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 =  𝑂(𝑁√𝑁) 
total time.  For these tests, the MTS + SAO anytime responses are forced after a random 
number of iterations between the bounds N and 𝑁√𝑁, which tends towards 𝑂(𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁) in 
expectation.  The level of regret achieved by this amount of computation is not necessarily 
minimal but is competitive.  These tests are therefore setup to provide a crude analysis of a 
regret ratio (e.g. competitive or minimal) for a prototypical GAIGE implementing the MTS 
+ SAO algorithms on hard inputs.  The benchmarks also offer a glimpse into the expected 
compliance of the GAIGE as a hypermodern solver with soft RTO deadline constraints. 
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Figure 4.4 displays a small set of benchmarks which illustrate the convergence rates of 
GAIGE for a variety of conditions. 
Figure 4.4.  Benchmarked regret convergence for the GAIGE. 
 
 
Results show that for large 𝜀 = 𝑓(𝛾),𝑁 and large T, the perturbations do not dominate the 
base payoffs and sufficient runtime is present for a near-complete regret minimization.  As 
T becomes larger than approximately √𝑁, the GAIGE converges on the 𝜀 generating 
functions and fixates towards a single mixture of pure strategies which provide a regret in 
the vicinity of 𝜀.   
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The converged strategies chosen by the GAIGE are robust to perturbations of 
magnitudes less than or equal to |𝜀𝑚𝑎𝑥|.  The selected strategies offer competitive (and in 
some cases minimal) regret, and correspond to an 𝜀-approximate trembling-hand perfect 
equilibrium.  This is a highly sought after solution concept for general game-playing agents.  
Results show the GAIGE achieves these results on modest hardware and for relatively large 
datasets within sub-second execution times. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Recapitulation 
This thesis examines asset integrity governance under extremely general conditions.  
The problem is classically formulated as an instance of risk-based planning.  The integrity 
of a physical asset is then governed using the solutions prescribed by an MDP or POMDP 
model.  The first chapter of this thesis highlights several gaps in the existing approaches.  
It also serves to contrast the difference between specialized and generalized techniques.  
Many of the existing asset integrity frameworks are most suitable for/when: 
 Well-defined, project-based integrity assessments; where sufficient domain context, 
expert knowledge, and a priori information produce asset-specific performance 
measures. 
 Assets operating in harsh environments; where risk-sources are naïve (non-
adaptive), and risks represent stochastic background processes and/or accidental 
event arrivals. 
 Offline analysis; where integrity modelling is performed using large batches of real 
or simulated data, and action planning is accomplished over longer, predetermined 
time-scales. 
 Non-autonomous planning and governance; where human experts are required to 
be in the loop on a continuous basis, and direct supervision may be critical to the 
evaluation and assessment of integrity plans.   
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Extending these frameworks constitutes the bulk of this work.  Asset integrity 
governance is fundamentally revisited using a more abstract and general interpretation.  In 
Chapter 2, several performance measures are identified from the literature on dynamical 
models, graphs, complex networks, and dependable systems.  This material is crucial to the 
understanding of the generalized asset as an information structure.  Through this paradigm, 
generalized assets are typically expressed in one of several well-defined modelling forms: 
 Description Languages; such as the Model Description Language (MDL), the 
Process Specification Language (PSL), Architectural Component Language 
(ACL), Unified Modelling Language (UML), and their corresponding file-types:  
.uml, .xml, etc. 
 Schematic-Defined; Organizational flowcharts, process flow and logic control 
diagrams, with file-types: .cad, .fea, etc. 
 Graph-Defined; Block diagrams, state-transition diagrams, binary-monotone 
systems, complex networks, etc. 
Generalized asset performance is assessed using a combination of fitness-based and 
similarity-based measures.  Chapter 2 also advocates a two-part compilation of model 
information.  This reasoning is valid for all assets, and performed in the following manner: 
 First, construct several reference configurations using the appropriate description 
type.  For example, binary monotone fitness for MDL, GPI for graph-defined 
assets, reference files for schematics, etc. 
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 Second, compute the NCD or edit distance between all pairs of reference 
configurations. 
This procedure can be coupled with the expected utility of having the asset maintain a 
particular configuration.  This results in a set of integrity scores which represent universal 
performance criteria.  The integrity scores can be interpreted as state-transition costs, 
payoffs, derived utility, benefits or rewards, depending on the context. 
These values form an array which is representative of a succinct-form game.  Chapter 
3 elaborates these ideas further, and serves the dual purpose of emphasizing and recruiting 
game-theory as a basis for asset integrity planning.  Several key points can be concluded 
from this portion of the work: 
 Risks and their sources - are in general not simply naïve, but rather adaptive and in 
a broad sense optimal under symmetric information and actionable resources. 
 Hostile environments - expose an asset to harsh environments as well as the actions 
of intelligent adversaries. 
 Game-theoretic planning - extends decision-theoretic planning, and is essential for 
assets tasked with persisting in hostile environments. 
Games can be reasoned about using several different formats.  This work contrasts the 
normal-form, extensive-form, and succinct-form game representations.  The most 
important solution concepts are also examined.  These include but are not limited to; Nash 
Equilibrium, Trembling Hand Equilibrium, Von Neumann Minimax Potential. 
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Several trends in high-performance planning are outlined in Chapter 4.  This work 
proposed a set of guidelines for solving integrity games via autonomous game-playing 
agents.  Requirements were specified at both the architectural and algorithmic levels.  The 
overall theme was based on a set of demands and constraints called hypermodern.  
Hypermodern planning agents predominantly advocate: 
 Domain-oblivious;  Planning in the face of extreme uncertainty, including few, if 
any, assumptions regarding the nature of the problem. 
 Agnostic learning;  Unsupervised improvement of activities and results, in the 
presence of little or no reinforcement feedback, context, or dependencies. 
 Anytime scalable;  Solution quality improves with additional computational 
resources and exhibits a strong competitive ratio. 
 Defensive Forecasting;  The agent responds in a robust, non-brittle, interruptible 
real-time online manner (pessimistic reflex).  Whilst through anytime scaling, 
gracefully increases its optimism through a near-line expansion or offline 
component (proactive deliberation). 
 Non-standard analysis;  The agent is essentially non-bayesian, non-parametric, and 
mitigates the need for sampling. 
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Chapter 4 also presented the algorithms implemented by a prototypical GAIGE.  
Inspired by optimal substructure and dynamic programming, the MTS algorithm was 
developed to take advantage of the repeated symmetry of the base game.  The minimax 
trajectories produced by MTS are used to generate a preliminary action plan, while also 
being fed into the SAO bandit algorithm for additional deliberation.  The SAO bandit tests 
the performance of each pure minimax strategy against the game history to determine the 
nature of the payoff perturbations.  The probabilities of selecting a particular strategy are 
then updated according to the amount of regret experienced by the algorithm, and whether 
it is consistent with stochastic or adversarial lines of play.  This solves the perturbed game 
by devising mixed strategy equilibria which are approximately trembling hand perfect.  The 
best-known strategies are always available for output, to be leveraged for any appropriate 
policy control, management platform, or governance oversight. 
Finally, a prototypical GAIGE implementation is benchmarked on synthetic data sets.  
This serves as a first-step towards additional validation, which will stress-test the expected 
behaviour across several asset classes and operational domains.  Results from these 
rudimentary benchmarks show a GAIGE capable of delivering competitive regret 
minimization on arbitrary problem types and scaling into large problem sizes. 
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5.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
The themes surrounding this research are relatively broad and shallow, albeit their 
combination is novel.  Generalized asset integrity games are a theoretical, multi-
disciplinary construct with many potential applications.  Chapter 1 draws on risk-based 
asset integrity management, existing models and their functionality.  Chapter 2 draws its 
inspiration from results in model theory, information theory, graph theory, complex 
networks, and dependable systems engineering.  Chapter 3 is devoted to game theory, in 
particular the algorithmic expectations and complexity issues of game structures and their 
solutions.  Meanwhile, Chapter 4 sought lessons from requirements design, systems 
architecture, autonomous planning, and anytime algorithms.  The culmination point is the 
GAIGE which, as with many frameworks in their infancy, is currently more of a conceptual 
placeholder than a field-proven technology.  It is therefore recommended that future work 
expand these ideas in four major directions: 
(I.) Enhanced Representational Power.  Support the ever more general asset 
representations and universal evaluation measures as they become available.  Plans 
in the GAIGE represents a sequence of actions, which themselves represent 
prescribed state-transitions between model reference configurations.  What exactly 
such state-transitions may entail physically is of upstream or downstream concern.   
The current work examined several modelling institutions and settled on evaluation 
functions based on graph topology and description complexity.  Future work along 
this line would recruit additional ideas from model and information theory to 
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produce representations of ever more broader and general classes of assets, and their 
(integrity) performance. 
(II.) Architectural and Algorithmic Improvements.  Autonomous reasoning, planning, 
and decision-making techniques are continuously improving.  Future work along 
this line would see the GAIGE utilize a wider and more appropriate palette of 
solution concepts from game theory, optimal control, and dynamical systems 
theory.  It is recommended to recruit from the literature on general game-playing 
agents, sampling algorithms, agnostic machine learning, and anytime optimization.  
These endeavours would seek to devise even better regret and complexity bounds. 
(III.) Implementation Scale-Up.  The current GAIGE implementation is only 
prototypical.  It was developed as a simple software agent in the Python language.  
The program code runs as a script/daemon and makes use of multiprocessing 
capabilities, but is far from optimized.  A full-scale software implementation would 
likely be refactored into C to work in conjunction with other tools and interface 
with several management information systems.  In the limit, a full-scale solver 
based on the GAIGE could potentially recruit the power of a GPU cluster or custom 
hardware. 
(IV.) Additional validation.  General game-playing agents are somewhat novel, and 
there is no strongly agreed upon method of benchmarking.  As such, a more 
encompassing, standardized test suite would have to be developed.  Future work 
should assess the game-playing strengths and weaknesses across highly distinct 
asset types.  
130 
 
 
5.3 Closing Remarks 
This research was undertaken with respect to a single maxim:  abstraction and 
generalization over focus and specialization.  In a world of increasingly fit-for-purpose 
engineering, application-specific frameworks, and tailor-made solutions, is it at all possible 
to do more with less?  At the very least, this thesis explores this question.  In and of itself, 
the pursuit yields value-adding research and development which is often overlooked – 
particularly within the sphere of engineering.  More pragmatically, these efforts contribute 
by addressing a real-world, industrial impetus.  This work surveyed a large, multi-
disciplinary body of literature, and produced a working prototype which holds its own 
against the state-of-the-art.  In essence, the answer to our question appears to be affirmative. 
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Appendix I – Architectural Overview of the GAIGE 
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Appendix II –Potential Applications and Worked Examples 
 
This appendix revisits the concepts of generalized assets through examples.  Each scenario 
is representative of a broad class of assets, processes, systems, as well as their typical 
modelling paradigms.  The selected case studies illustrate how a distinct, real-world asset 
may be approached and refactored as a generalized asset.  This epitomizes much of the pre-
processing required before ongoing planning and analysis can be effectuated using the 
GAIGE.  It is hoped that these worked examples will further demonstrate the range of 
potential applications, shedding light on the inherent versatility of this formulation, 
architecture, and implementation.   
 
Example 1.  Cyber-Physical Asset given by its Design-Structure-Matrix (DSM).  Case 
study of a networked industrial supply facility for the KVN Company. 
  
Systems engineering of products, processes, and organizations require tools and 
techniques for decomposition and integration.  A design structure matrix (DSM) provides 
a simple, compact, and visual representation of a complex system that supports innovative 
solutions to decomposition and integration problems [Eppinger and Browning, 2012].  
Generalized Assets may be specified using a DSM, which offers an alternative 
representation for the analysis of critical system components and their interactions.  In this 
example, a physical asset is a localized industrial network within some warehouse, port, or 
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manufacturing and supply facility.  The physical asset components consist of heavy-duty 
materials handling equipment, transportation machinery, and storage modules.   This asset 
also has a number of cyber components including a wireless sensor network for 
surveillance, monitoring and tracking services, autonomous robots and devices for 
scanning and packaging, and an integrated information management system.  The objective 
is to operate these multi-domain subsystems and their critical components together in a 
parsimonious manner.  Here, the generalized asset is the active information structure which 
captures the relevant features of the entire cyber-physical system and unifies their 
indicators for evaluation.  The generalized asset integrity represents a global state of 
idealness or correctness between the many functional dependencies, interactions, and 
process influences.  This also includes the fitness levels of the various subsystems and 
components.   
Figure A2.1 depicts a DSM model which has already been developed for this 
particular cyber-physical asset.  The DSM maps naturally into a generalized asset 
representation.  The DSM model implicitly includes many of the graph performance 
indicators and fitness-based assessments of Section 2.1, such as vertex centrality and binary 
monotone importance.  Therefore, less work is required to compose integrity scores “from 
the ground up”.  As an added bonus, the nature of this particular asset is such that many of 
its components are locally intelligent and implement self-diagnostic protocols.  This allows 
a treatment of certain decision-making criteria, such as repair, maintenance, and servicing 
forecasts, to act as elements within the DSM itself.  
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Figure A2.1.  DSM for the KVN industrial supply facility as a generalized asset. 
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The “raw” generalized asset is therefore a 216 x 216 matrix formed directly from the 
DSM itself.   By amalgamating knowledge from KVN engineers, systems integrators, 
suppliers, and floor managers, the major dependencies were reduced to the following 
criticality levels:  3 (red) – very strong, 2 (pink) – medium, and 1 (yellow) – low.  Although 
these interactions revealed many dynamic relationships, a static and domain-oblivious 
analysis was performed to derive the baseline reference configurations for the generalized 
asset.  Many scenarios were considered, with most falling into one of the following 
categories: 
 The class of complete shutdown conditions, owing to multiple failures, unplanned 
downtime, catastrophic exposures, etc. 
 A class of planned shutdown or (near)-offline conditions. 
 Various “lights out” operating conditions, owing to major operations performed 
autonomously by cybernetic systems, and/or with humans-out-of-the-loop during 
off-hours. 
 A set of high-output and maximum performance conditions in terms of energy use, 
risk exposure, and utility return. 
 The class of low-energy, low-hazard, or low-risk conditions, again owing to times 
where business continuity can be maintained without heavy production and 
equipment aging.  This includes scenarios with no presence of hazardous materials, 
minimal storage, occupancy, personnel, as well as other dependencies which 
mitigate workplace entropy. 
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 Various cyclical and transient conditions, owing to various on-demand and just-in-
time production and off-equilibrium output to optimize value, chiefly resulting 
from the cycling of logistical processes such as resupply, rerouting, and 
housekeeping tasks. 
 A set of randomly generated “anomalous” conditions owing to the cyber-physical 
nature of the asset, as well as the potential exposure to intelligent threats, software 
risks, and other unforeseen operating regimes. 
These conditions were used to construct a set of representative reference configurations 
from the (unwieldly large) set of possible configurations. Figure A2.2 illustrates how a 
DSM-defined generalized asset would appear configured under a number of different 
scenarios. 
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Figure A2.2.  DSM for KVN industrial supply facility under different scenarios. 
 
 Constructing the set of reference configurations characterizes an offline pre-
processing step through fitness-based metrics which require significant computational 
resources.  Further evaluations involve the hashing of integrity scores based on similarity-
based measures such as the normalized compression distance (NCD).  This alleviates the 
need for additional fitness-based assessments, and is conducive towards hypermodern 
analysis.   In this example, the reference DSM are sufficiently compact, suppressing the 
need for sophisticated decomposition and encoding schemes, such as the joint spectral 
distance or algebraic matrix characterization methods.  The standard < 𝐾𝑣, 𝐾𝑒 , 𝐾𝑁 >
−𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 representation is applicable, with 𝐾𝑣 = 1,  𝐾𝑒 = 2,  𝐾𝑁 = 20 offering a complete 
state-transition-graph with 20 vertices, and 400 edges.  The state-transition-system formed 
by this asset is therefore a 20 x 20 weighted adjacency matrix, with each of the 400 elements 
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requiring an integrity score evaluation.  For simplicity of depiction, Figure A2.3 illustrates 
the state-transition-graph formed by a more simplified < 1,2,8 > asset. 
 
Figure A2.3.  A <1, 2, 8>-complete graph for the KVN facility. 
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The similarity between each pair of DSM configurations is computed using the 
NCD.  To perform the NCD computations, the DSM are first converted into bit arrays and 
saved as .dsm files without header metadata in a manner similar to the raw (uncompressed) 
.gif file format.  For this application the GZIP program was used as the compressor to 
compute NCD values.  The GZIP program implements a lossless compression algorithm of 
Lempel and Ziv (LZW), and is suitable for NCD comparisons between generic file objects. 
 Each of the reference configurations assumes an inverse monotonic relationship 
between the NCD and long-run expected Von-Neumann utility.  If the generalized asset is 
modelled coherently and consistently, then large differences between descriptions (e.g. two 
particularly different DSM configurations) correspond to large differences in derived 
utilities.  This is useful in developing the final integrity scores, which map and scale the 
NCD values into integer numbers for computational speedups.  The integrity scores are the 
assigned edge weights of the final state-transition graph which is used as input into the 
GAIGE and corresponds to a succinct-form integrity game.  The integrity scores always 
represent compound “move and hold” operations.  The magnitude of a score is derived from 
two contributions:  (i.) the NCD value of the “move”, and (ii.) the VNM-utility value of the 
“hold”.  The move is captured by the inverse NCD score, and signifies the degree of rework 
costs.  A large NCD parallels numerous component change-orders for the asset manager, 
such as maintenance and repair activities at the KVN facility.  A large NCD could also 
represent numerous disruptions and more focused destructive efforts on the part of an 
intelligent adversary or natural antagonist.  The hold simply provides for the vector sum of 
the relative utility derived from all productions, operations, costs and losses, revenues, 
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liabilities, and other socio-economic benefits for maintaining the asset in a particular global 
state (therein normalized for one time-step).  In the current work, the combined move and 
hold integrity score is collected and rewarded immediately and is not future or past 
discounted. 
Because of real-world limitations, some state transitions may be “nigh impossible” 
to achieve.  This might represent the cyber-physical constraints of delivering extreme 
repairs or damages in relatively short time steps.  In these extreme cases, a particular edge 
of the graph would be blocked and the respective integrity score(s) would simply be 
replaced with a null symbol, effectively reducing the number of state-transitions available 
to a player.  This particular example uses reference configurations which were chosen in 
such a way as to always be available within one time step, albeit with potentially 
strategically important magnitudes, reflected by very large or very small integrity scores. 
 Figure A2.4 tabulates the NCD, VNM, and overall integrity scores for one potential 
reconfiguration of the asset.  These scores represent the potential reward derived from a 
global state transition from the offline condition (source vertex labelled as the 0th vertex, 
vertex_i) to any of the 𝑁 = 20 other reference conditions (vertex_j destination vertices).  
Values in the VNM ($/minute) column are present-value forecasts derived from an 
expected annual operating income of $63M for the asset.  This corresponds to 
approximately $120/minute of uptime in the maximal state and $70/minute uptime in the 
“sweet spot” of ideal working state (in a static sense).  
Figure A2.5 plots the performance scaling of these reconfiguration metrics.  In these 
figures, the source vertex is vertex_0, i.e. the asset existing in an offline condition.  In kind, 
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vertex_20 denotes a fully working configuration at maximum levels of production.  This is 
evidenced by the higher VNM utility.  This transition however, does not correspond to the 
highest integrity score.  This is because a reconfiguration from vertex_0 to vertex_20 is 
dominated by the move component rather than the hold component in the compound move-
and-hold operation registered by the integrity scores.  In other words, minute for minute, it 
is far more expensive to restore the KVN facility from a totally offline to a completely 
working state then it is to capitalize on profits incurred immediately thereafter.  If the 
integrity game were played over a single time-step, the optimal transition would be 
vertex_0 to vertex_14, resulting in the best compromise between the NCD and VNM for a 
maximum integrity score yield.  Viz. generalized assets, the payoffs owing to a 
reconfiguration are realized by a combination of transition effects and their immediate 
returns, and these do not always correlate with higher performance levels using classical 
performance metrics such as network fitness or system availability. 
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Figure A2.4.  Asset reconfiguration potentials from the offline state to all other 
reference conditions.  
Source 
Destina-
tion 
NCD 
VNM 
($/mi-
nute) 
VNM (nor-
malized) 
Integrity 
Score 
Integrity Score 
(normalized) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0.1141 5 0.0044 1000 0.249 
0 2 0.2303 16 0.0141 1100 0.274 
0 3 0.1467 21 0.0185 1550 0.386 
0 4 0.1883 26 0.0229 1300 0.323 
0 5 0.1209 31 0.0274 1400 0.348 
0 6 0.2706 36 0.0318 1200 0.299 
0 7 0.2652 41 0.0362 1600 0.398 
0 8 0.3132 46 0.0406 1984 0.494 
0 9 0.2111 44 0.0388 1812 0.451 
0 10 0.3967 49 0.0432 1717 0.427 
0 11 0.4242 54 0.0477 2490 0.619 
0 12 0.5555 59 0.0521 2200 0.547 
0 13 0.5555 64 0.0565 2310 0.575 
0 14 0.6856 69 0.0609 2054 0.511 
0 15 0.7604 74 0.0653 2540 0.632 
0 16 0.7458 79 0.0697 2608 0.649 
0 17 0.8782 84 0.0741 2750 0.684 
0 18 0.9174 105 0.0927 2780 0.692 
0 19 0.9845 110 0.0971 2800 0.697 
0 20 0.9847 120 0.1059 3000 0.746 
- Vertices ordered by k-out-of-N:G criteria.    
- EdgeID = <vertex_source, vertex_sink>    
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Figure A2.5.  Plot of the performance scaling for a reconfiguration of the asset (offline 
to all other configurations). 
 
 
These figures provide some insight into the expected integrity levels and 
performance characteristics of the generalized asset.  Enumerated to exhaustion (every 
source to every destination), they also express a succinct form payoff matrix for the base 
integrity game.  The full 400 x 400 input array is used to initialize governance of the asset 
via the GAIGE.  As the asset evolves in real-time, the integrity scores are updated as 
component conditions are reported through an aggregation of various monitoring and 
sensory channels which integrate a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
stream.  The GAIGE periodically performs a simple check to see if the array has sufficiently 
changed to warrant a re-computation of the optimal strategies.  If the integrity scores have 
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changed significantly, the GAIGE performs an MTS of the new array and attempts 
additional deliberation through the use of SAO-bandits.  The best-available strategies are 
always available for generation as an output to the user or to the information management 
system.  The planning horizon for the asset accounts both stochastic and adversarial 
disruptions.  Asset behaviour was simulated over 360,000 one-minute time-steps using 
historical data obtained from standard operations at the KVN facility.  This is equivalent in 
duration to 6000 hours of operation or a period of 24/7 uptime across 250 days.   At each 
time-step, a new payoff matrix was generated based on a perturbation of the previous 
integrity scores, with each value drawn from an unknown distribution amongst some family 
of distributions (e.g. Bernoulli and exponential).  For stopping-time simplicity, a random 
amount of additional deliberation (up to 10 seconds) was accorded every 100th time-step to 
visualize the effect of SAO-bandit “corrections”.  The strategies reported by the GAIGE 
were smoothed up to larger time-scales for illustration.  Figure A2.6 reports a sample 
sequence of prescribed state-transitions relative to five initial conditions (given by DSM 
configurations at vertices 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20) over 1 hour intervals.  For these time steps 
no SAO-bandit deliberation was performed.  A perturbation event was introduced at time-
step 20, causing many of the strategies to resettle under different minimax trajectories.  The 
event can be interpreted as an arbitrary disruption, tremble, or noisy realization of state 
which causes the integrity scores to change, inducing a correction to the optimal lines of 
play. 
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Figure A2.6.  An example set of state-transition trajectories provided by the GAIGE.
 
 
 Figure A2.7 showcases the level of regret experienced by the GAIGE relative to a 
correct line of play in hindsight.  The figure is developed for a single strategy profile based 
on the asset being initialized in configuration 12.  The GAIGE chooses actions using the 
MTS algorithm only, except every 10th round where it is allowed access to up to 10 seconds 
of additional deliberation using the SAO-bandit.  These anytime intervals are counted as a 
single update step, during which a history of regret is used to examine the most promising 
strategies and adjust future actions.   
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In these tests, regret was revealed as the difference between the total integrity score 
so far accumulated by the GAIGE (using MTS and every so often MTS+SAO), and the 
integrity score of a perfectly “omniscient” player using a fixed strategy that also accounts 
for all future perturbation events.  This corresponds to the probability of selecting the 
correct strategy or sequence of actions.  Figure A2.7 shows a convergence which is 
progressively more resilient to adversarial and stochastic perturbations.  This is a defensive 
yet opportunistic integrity plan which also corresponds to an approximate trembling-hand 
equilibrium. 
 
Figure A2.7.  Example of the (inverse, cumulative) regret from the actions prescribed 
by GAIGE using a combination of MTS and SAO algorithms. 
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The GAIGE would be regularly updated in a live setting, where it would interface 
and support other information systems and decision support tools.  A more robust, scaled-
up version could theoretically act as a force-multiplier for the asset integrity authorities at 
KVN.  Additional context, expert/domain knowledge, and specialized optimizations would 
likely be required for an actual production environment.  Nonetheless, by way of this 
generalized, agnostic methodology, one can effectively govern the high-level operational 
configuration of any DSM-defined asset.  The KVN facility is a networked industrial centre 
for supply and distribution operations.  It represents a cyber-physical asset.  Passing the 
DSM representation into generalized asset form and then planning via the GAIGE enables 
advanced budgeting for supply chain disruptions, equipment downtime, and machinery 
throttling. 
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Example 2.  Critical infrastructure assets given by a complex evolving network of 
interdependencies.  Case study:  Integrity governance for an Unmanned Aerial 
Traffic Management System (UTM).  
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Systems (UASs) are witnessing 
widespread deployment as force-multipliers for several industries and public-serving 
sectors.  A small subset of potential applications include agricultural, forestry, and natural 
resources data collection and condition monitoring, rail and road network surveillance, low-
altitude radar and speed enforcement, aerial telemetry and streaming, search and rescue, 
and cargo delivery. 
It is anticipated that the increasing ubiquity of UAVs and UASs will drive the 
development of Unmanned Aerial Traffic Management Systems (UTMs).  A notional UTM 
may be small or large scale, while publically or privately owned and operated.  Various 
UTM architectures have been put forth, with no particular consensus on the applicable 
topology (e.g. distributed or centralized), legal frameworks, regulations, or governance 
practices.   Nonetheless, the potential for low-altitude, short and long term air-space leasing 
has driven the need for integrated management systems which autonomously guide and 
direct fleets of UAS assets.  The near-term goals of UTM architectures are to enable low-
altitude UAV/UAS operations with demonstrated safety and security.  The long-term goals 
for a UTM typically seek to tighten requirements and strengthen capabilities.   These may 
include addressing emerging threats and vulnerabilities, improving efficiency, and 
increasing asset/fleet capacity, autonomy and endurance.   
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UTMs are typically classified as portable or persistent.  A persistent UTM is 
optimized for high-availability missions and implements centralized governance of a large 
territory, such as a provincial district.  In this sense it is very much akin to existing air-
traffic management (ATM) infrastructure.  The portable UTM is more embedded.  It is 
favored for ad hoc, high-utility missions and private projects.  It manages a smaller fleet of 
assets over a localized region, such as a city or county.  The portable UTM can often be 
field-deployed alongside several of the UAV/UAS whereas the persistent UTM operates 
out of a fixed facility.  Both classes of UTM support differing business models owing to 
different advocacy groups and use cases.   
Figure A2.8 illustrates a UTM based on novel proposals from NASA and 
commercial partners who are enabling the development of a Low Altitude Traffic and Air 
Safety (LATAS) Platform. 
    
Figure A2.8.  Notional UTM for UAV/UAS operations, courtesy of NASA. 
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Ongoing UTM and LATAS development efforts seek to connect and integrate 
leading airspace management technologies into an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) 
package for commercial and recreational drone operators, as well as regulators and air 
traffic controllers.  
 In this example, we consider a private IaaS provider certified by a national 
regulating authority to operate a fixed entity (persistent) county-level UTM.  The UTM is 
modelled holistically as a system-of-systems (SoS).  This choice of modelling approach 
allows a rapid integration of critical asset features.  During preliminary design, a static 
dependability analysis of the components and subsystems was conducted.  This was a 
bottom-up offline analysis, beginning with reliability block diagrams (RBD) and fault-tree 
analyzes (FTA).  Results provided insight into the availability and disposition of several 
asset dependencies and their logical relationships.  This knowledge was used to perform a 
series of fitness evaluations of the systems within the overall SoS.  The SoS itself is a large 
collection of hierarchically clustered interacting manifests.  The SoS is also a graph, and 
when properly defined embodies yet another example of a generalized asset.   
The expected (dynamic) operating risks, importance levels, and criticality of 
various elements are found using several of the graph-performance indicators (GPI) 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Figure A2.9 presents a summary of the SoS which is used to form 
a reference configuration for the UTM as a generalized asset.  
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Figure A2.9.  The generalized asset information structure for an Unmanned Aerial 
Traffic Management System (UTM). 
 
 The proposed UTM is modelled as a generalized asset given by a SoS with critical 
modelling ensembles: 
 Intelligent Datalink Management.  Manages the communications, protocols, link 
and access control events, error correction and control, etc. 
 GIS-Based Maps and Missions.  Provides the collaboration between geomatics and 
GIS systems to enable GPS/satellite guided mapping and dynamic mission planning 
services. 
 Risk Sensing & Avoidance.  Encompasses the cognitive protocols, SCADA, and 
swarm optimization algorithms for the primary sensing, detection, and avoidance 
tasks. 
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 UAV/UAS Fleet Reporting and Definitions.  Primary SCADA for fleet operations 
including individual and coordinated mission logistics, airspace status, physical 
health, and condition monitoring for deployed and reserve UAV/UAS assets. 
 Geofencing and Failsafe.  Manages the failsafe behaviour for various flight modes, 
including operating range constraints, signal strength limitations, airspace 
coordinate safety limits, emergency procedures and lost-link return/evacuation 
policies. 
 Air Traffic Management (ATM) Interfacing.  Encapsulates the correspondence 
with proper ATM systems from other authorities for weather information, auxiliary 
traffic reports, or other commands and notifications. 
 Payload Tracking and Handling.  Manages the end-to-end processing of physical 
payloads for delivery or digital contingency services such as reconnaissance and 
remote data acquisition.  Handles the induction queuing, shipping confirmation, and 
de-queueing of parcels and packets through the UTM facilities and airspace 
infrastructure. 
 Physical (Ground) Structures and Facilities.  Management of the UTM supporting 
physical infrastructure, including operating grounds and facilities, warehousing, 
ground vehicles, and related monitoring, security and surveillance. 
 Cloud-Based Interfacing.  Includes components which regulate the cloud-based 
platforms and services such as physical hardware, remote storage and access, 
internet-driven protocols, processes and devices, and user-enabled functionality. 
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 Source Power and Energy Distribution.  The subsystems responsible for 
interfacing with power/utility infrastructure and supplying energy.  Includes 
regulation and distribution of electrical power and backups within the UTM. 
 
The UTM is expected to persist in a hostile environment.  The UTM is exposed to a 
variety of risks but is predominantly sensitive to adverse weather conditions, extended 
power grid outages, communications jamming and disruption, as well as unforeseen 
technical failures.  Adversarial threats include deliberate airspace congestion, landing zone 
obfuscation or harassment, malicious actions against drones, false orders/requests, and 
many others.  Multiple safety and security measures are in place to minimize the attack 
surface by design.  Despite these efforts, the UTM remains exposed to the continuous threat 
of cyber-attacks.  Several potential vectors exist, including actions which glitch the 
SCADA or GIS subsystems to provide incorrect mission commands, as well as disabling 
or hijacking aerial assets.  Attacks may also attempt to compromise the privacy and safety 
of sensitive data or payload information.   Other vectors include the distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks on the various external interfaces.  A weaker adversary might utilize 
these tactics in an attempt to disrupt the quality of service (QoS).  Finally, there are 
vulnerabilities to physical intrusion and damage to the facilities, owing to perimeter 
surveillance and security failures (or attacks). 
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 The performance of this generalized asset is calculated for several scenarios which 
manifest themselves as N = 100 significant reference configurations in a manner similar to 
the previous example.  A set of N2 =10,000 baseline integrity scores are derived from long-
run VNM-utility expectations and reconfiguration efforts computed using the NCD.  
Results are formulated into a succinct payoff array for input into the GAIGE.  The UTM 
gathers and processes data asynchronously.  Update frequencies range from sub one-second 
time intervals for dynamic positioning and sensing subsystems, to upwards of 7 days based 
on a lack of change-detection in certain physical components and ground facilities.  As 
such, the update priorities for elements within the generalized asset may be adjusted based 
on change criticality, plausibility, or detection.  This scheduling reduces the size and 
number of active array elements considered by the GAIGE at any one time-step.  State-
transition actions which recover the asset from immediate issues are evaluated before 
deliberating over less impending concerns.  A prudent allocation of anytime resources also 
serves the defensive forecasting requirements, where the initial best-available plans are also 
the most secure (MTS), and deprecated opportunistically as optimization times permit 
(SAO-bandits). 
 Generalized asset operations are simulated for a horizon of 10 hours, corresponding 
to a session of normal UTM missions/activities subject to naïve discrete event arrivals and 
their ideal response/recovery.  Naïve events are sampled using a variety of distributions, 
and model the ever-changing weather conditions, airspace traffic reports, sense and avoid 
trajectory deviations, signal strengths, ATM and cloud-based notifications. 
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To impress the need for game-playing agents in the face of adversarial dynamics, a 
series of deliberately planned remotely-executed minimax trajectory disruptions are 
introduced.  These represent intelligent attacks which can be recovered from relatively 
quickly, yet are useful for examining fleet and airspace resilience.   In this example, a GPS 
navigation glitch is considered, which triggers the failsafe and geofencing protocols.  An 
electrical power disruption is considered, engaging the backup supplies and initiating a 
return-to-home procedure on all UAV/UAS.  Finally, two cloud-based DDoS attacks are 
considered, resulting in temporary QoS adaptation.  For simplicity, the class of 
‘catastrophic’ and/or large-scale physical denial of the fleet or ground facilities is not 
considered.  Such events would inevitably result in a near one-shot transition to the 
completely failed endgame state.  In such a configuration the UTM activities are suspended 
indefinitely and no further analysis is required from an integrity planning perspective. 
The planning horizon for the GAIGE is therefore T = 36,000 one-second time-steps 
simulating 10 hours of hostile environment persistence.  During this time, the asset 
undergoes adaptive oscillations as changes to the UTM configuration are observed and 
innovated upon in the manner prescribed by the GAIGE.  At each time-step, the GAIGE 
re-plans a sequence of actions and transitions the asset accordingly.  This results in a series 
of planned vs. actual trajectories.  Figure A2.10 illustrates the time-evolution of the asset 
under GAIGE recommended governance from a particularly safe starting configuration 
until the end of simulation. 
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Figure A2.10.  Evolution of the UTM under governance from the GAIGE. 
 
 
In the above plot, the horizontal x-axis indexes a time-step which averages 20 
minutes of condition monitoring and integrity evaluations.   The vertical y-axis indexes a 
derived integer integrity score scaled between 0 and 100.  This represents the payoff level 
awarded at the end of a round of simulated gameplay.  In this regard, the reference 
configurations have been ranked and scaled in order to illustrate how the integrity of a UTM 
would be governed.  Correct UTM management seeks to continuously maximize the area 
under the curve(s) with respect to utility yields; the adversary attempting to do the opposite 
(minimize the area); and nature acting as a random noise signal (which can aid either party).  
This generalized asset evolves in accordance with the discrete events registered within the 
UTM.  At each round, the GAIGE updates its forecast of what it believes to be an optimal 
sequence of state-transitions.  This planning is conducted using a 200-ply lookahead for the 
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backwards induction of the MTS algorithm.  Random amounts of SAO bandit iterations 
(nearline bloom) are also included.  The faint dotted lines in Figure A2.10 illustrate the 
GAIGE-prescribed plans at the end of each round.  For clarity only the first 10 state 
transitions are plotted.  The bold red line indicates the time-history of noisy realizations of 
state-transitions, as prescribed by the GAIGE (updated at each round), but owing to 
incomplete state observations (noise), imperfect actions (trembles), and intelligent 
disruptions. 
The operational time frame simulated in this example was subject to several 
stochastic disruptions and adversarial attacks.  An interpretation of the results demonstrates 
that current versions of the GAIGE are overly conservative.  The GAIGE often hedges 
against hostilities at every time step.  This results in grim prognostics towards low-yield 
asset operations, a byproduct of minimax aspirations from continuously competing against 
the world.  In practice this extreme prudence would (hopefully) become unnecessary 
through a combination of protective measures and the influential deterrents of policing and 
honest citizenry (i.e. human integrity).  Realistically an adversary will only strike with 
bounded resources, placing an upper bound on the frequency, amplitude and phase of 
superimposed attack patterns.  In game theory even the slightest resource disparity between 
attacker and defender can introduce unwinnable conditions for the poorer player and 
autopilot strategies for the richer.  In this example, the offensive prowess of adversaries (in 
terms of their observational and degradation capabilities) were assumed to be in balance 
with the restorative capabilities of the UTM.   The development of better adversarial threat 
models would allow the integrity governance of cyber-physical infrastructure to be less 
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pessimistically challenged.  Unfortunately this process would be require expert input and 
result in a more domain-specific approach.  As adversarial due diligence becomes more 
common place, these additional modelling details will be required before production-scaled 
assets are authorized to operate within real-world hostile environments. 
The (actual) time-evolution of the asset given by its changing integrity scores can 
be seen as a series of reconfiguration expenditures.  Figure A2.10 shows the GAIGE 
buffering against the long-run losses from an impending set of adversarial and stochastic 
disruptions.  These are the expected trajectories in terms of reconfigurations, which are 
minimax worst case unless the bandits risk otherwise.   
Figure A2.10 can also be interpreted in purely UTM game-playing terms.  At the 
end of time-step 5, weather conditions force the asset into a lower integrity score.  The 
GAIGE then reassesses its integrity plan from this new (somewhat unforeseen and 
unavoidable) condition.  In time-step 6, the GAIGE actually considers a potential 
vulnerability to attack in round 11, and updates its integrity plan in defense of this credible 
future.  The adversary senses this innovation and strikes with an unannounced DDoS attack 
during time-steps 8 and 9 (instead of 11).  This forces the asset to drop into a hardened 
configuration with safer fleet posturing and higher alert levels.  This caution results in a 
lower integrity score for several rounds.  The DDoS releases after time-steps 12-13, at 
which point the GAIGE advises a cautionary relaxation out towards higher integrity scores.  
At time-step 23, the GAIGE finally decides it is time for a series of potent restoration and 
recalibration events, only to be immediately denied by the adversary who initiates GPS-
jamming activities.  The detection of these events forces a purposeful transition to a lower 
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integrity score – the UTM hardens in an attempt to pre-emptively buffer against further risk 
of airspace and IaaS integrity denial.  At the low points around time-step 25, the GAIGE 
anticipates an opportunity by around time-step 30 to recover a higher-orbit minimax 
trajectory.  This is in line with the long-run prescriptions made before the GPS-jamming.  
The asset eventually recovers to a reasonably maintainable integrity level by time-step 35 
onwards.  At this point the GAIGE is learning perturbation-robust strategies, and 
proactively fixing around an integrity level of 75 by the end of simulation. 
 The problem of sustaining safe and secure UTM operations within a low-altitude 
high-traffic airspace is a hypermodern challenge.  The combination of UAV/UAS assets, 
payloads and requests, fleet readiness, mission planning, physical facilities, and supporting 
infrastructures must collectively synergize to deliver a networked infrastructure as a service 
(IaaS).  The UTM paradigm is still in its infancy, but expected to mature within the next 
decade.  Whatever the particular architecture or design, a UTM can be modelled as a time-
evolving SoS, which can in turn be formulated as a generalized asset.  The usual domain-
oblivious fitness-based performance indicators from the theory of dependable networks, 
graph dynamics and topology continue to apply.  The agnostic, similarity-based evaluations 
from the theory of information and computability continue to serve a purpose, indicating 
how much an asset must reconfigure itself in terms of model description to achieve a 
desired outcome. 
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Potential applications of generalized asset integrity games to engineering problems. 
 
Formulating the problems of KVM facility management or UTM governance within 
the framework of generalized asset integrity games allows a compact representation of the 
information critical to imparting changes of global state.  Both DSM and SoS defined assets 
have been shown to be readily integrated into this framework. This process could be 
demonstrated for other modelling institutions, such as .XML or .UML drawings, DFA, 
state-transition tables, and extended to arbitrary connectionist diagrams.  This generality is 
extremely useful for rapidly (approximately) validating engineering proposals with 
minimal modelling and simulation overhead.  In this way, several reference configurations 
for a generalized asset can be pre-processed to yield a succinct-form payoff structure which 
can be passed into the GAIGE for minimal-regret planning and analysis.  As demonstrated 
by examples, the GAIGE is particularly adept at scoring the performance of complex cyber-
physical assets, critical infrastructures, and future service platforms such as the KVN 
facility or UTM concept.  This work establishes a framework for generalized asset 
performance, integrity games, and the GAIGE itself.  The overall process is expected to 
remain flexible and nearly identical across domains.  Many potential applications show 
promise in benefitting from this approach.  Among those actively being investigated:  
geospatial watershed integrity, water-distribution integrity, the integrity of sensitive 
ecosystems, aqua- and agri- culture logistics management, and high-speed rail transport 
systems. 
